Cuellar v. Keppel Amfels, L.L.C.
731 F.3d 342
| 5th Cir. | 2013Background
- Cuellar was placed at Keppel Amfels by temporary-agency Perma-Temp; Perma-Temp was the primary employer and Keppel Amfels the secondary (joint-employment).
- Cuellar took FMLA maternity leave in August 2008; while on leave Keppel Amfels hired a replacement and did not hold a position open for her.
- Perma-Temp did not refer Cuellar back to Keppel Amfels after her leave; a Perma-Temp record notes Keppel said it was "ending" her job, though Keppel’s HR disputes that characterization.
- When Cuellar sought to return, Keppel Amfels told her it was "doing fine without her" and would call if an opening arose; Perma-Temp suggested she seek unemployment.
- Cuellar sued Keppel Amfels under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (interference) and (a)(2) (retaliation); district court granted summary judgment for Keppel Amfels. Cuellar appeals only the § 2615(a)(1) interference claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a § 2615(a)(1) interference claim requires proof of discriminatory intent | Cuellar contends liability can attach without discriminatory intent because Keppel’s actions prevented reinstatement (a substantive entitlement) | Keppel argues intent is required and, in any event, its actions were permitted under joint-employment rules | Court assumes, arguendo, intent not required but decides claim fails on the merits; concurrence explains intent is not required where claim seeks deprivation of a substantive entitlement |
| Whether Keppel’s communications and replacement of Cuellar constituted unlawful interference with FMLA reinstatement rights | Cuellar says Keppel’s replacement, statements to Perma-Temp, and statements to her discouraged reinstatement, interfering with her rights | Keppel says as a secondary employer it had no obligation to reinstate absent a request from the primary employer and law allows filling positions during leave | Held for Keppel: replacing Cuellar and failing to request reinstatement did not, on these facts, amount to interference beyond what regulations permit |
| Proper standard to evaluate interference claim on summary judgment | Cuellar argues substantive-entitlement standard applies (no intent element) | Keppel argues interference claims should be judged with intent/retaliation framework | Court affirms dismissal because no genuine issue that Keppel’s conduct exceeded regulatory limits; concurrence clarifies analytical test (substantive-entitlement vs. retaliation) |
| Whether holding Keppel liable here would improperly convert secondary employer into primary employer | Cuellar argues secondary must not interfere with primary’s ability to seek reinstatement | Keppel warns liability would impose primary-employer duties on secondary employers | Court agrees with Keppel: liability on these facts would expand secondary obligations beyond the regulations and is unwarranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (summary-judgment standard on cross-motions)
- Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008) (genuine-issue standard for summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for assessing genuine factual disputes at summary judgment)
- Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002) (prejudice requirement for FMLA interference)
- Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 530 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2008) (FMLA purposes and leave/reinstatement framework)
- Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1999) (no intent required for claims seeking deprivation of substantive FMLA entitlements)
- Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999) (intent requirement in retaliation claims under FMLA)