924 F.3d 276
6th Cir.2019Background
- Sebree, KY contains six peaked railroad crossings on an active CSX line; the City enacted a 1966 ordinance requiring city-council approval before any change in grade at those crossings.
- In 1979 CSX’s predecessor (L&N) and the City entered an Agreed Order limiting how much two crossings could be raised (0.4 ft at Main; no raise at Dixon) after litigation over prior unauthorized work.
- CSX determined fouled ballast required maintenance; its preferred method (surfacing) raises track grade, while undercutting can avoid raising grade but, according to CSX, can weaken track safety on modern welded-rail, heavier/faster trains.
- In 2017 the City denied CSX permission to perform maintenance that would raise four crossings by 2–3 inches; CSX sued for injunctive relief seeking to bar enforcement of the Ordinance and the 1979 Agreed Order.
- The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Ordinance and Agreed Order as preempted; the City appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (CSX) | Defendant's Argument (City) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the City Ordinance is preempted by the Termination Act/FRSA | Ordinance unlawfully permits indefinite local control that prevents necessary maintenance and is preempted | Ordinance is a local police power addressing safety and does not unreasonably burden rail operations | Ordinance preempted (as-applied under §10501 and also preempted under FRSA) |
| Whether requiring alternative maintenance (undercutting) unreasonably burdens CSX | Forcing undercutting (instead of surfacing) creates safety risks and impedes uniform maintenance | Undercutting is a feasible, safer long-term solution and cost differences alone are not preemption | Requiring undercutting would unreasonably interfere with rail operations; Ordinance invalid as applied |
| Whether the 1979 Agreed Order remains enforceable | Agreed Order now unreasonably interferes with operations due to changed circumstances (heavier/faster trains, welded rails) and is preempted | Parties freely negotiated the agreement in 1979; contracts between sophisticated parties should be enforced | Agreed Order preempted and void as against public policy given changed conditions causing unreasonable interference |
| Scope of injunction: whether relief was overbroad | CSX sought injunction barring enforcement of Ordinance/Agreed Order and any action preventing CSX from raising tracks for maintenance | City argued injunction should be limited to enforcement of the two instruments | Court’s injunction is appropriately tailored to prohibit actions that would prevent CSX from raising tracks for maintenance and not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 248 F.3d 517 (6th Cir.) (presumption against preempting historic state police powers unless Congress’s purpose is clear)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (focus on statutory text to determine preemptive intent)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) (preemption analysis for railroad safety/regulatory scheme)
- N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238 (3d Cir.) (as-applied preemption test: unreasonable burden and nondiscrimination)
- New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321 (5th Cir.) (adopts STB comprehensive test for §10501 preemption)
- Blissfield v. Vill. of Blissfield, 550 F.3d 533 (6th Cir.) (discusses categorical vs. as-applied preemption under §10501)
- Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638 (2d Cir.) (local permit requirements may unduly interfere with railroad construction/operations)
- Nickels v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 560 F.3d 426 (6th Cir.) (FRSA regulations can substantially subsume subject matter and preempt state/local law)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 283 F.3d 812 (6th Cir.) (limits of FRSA savings clause and municipal regulation)
- PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212 (4th Cir.) (voluntary agreements generally enforceable but can be void if they unreasonably interfere with rail operations)
- Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718 (6th Cir.) (injunction scope should be tailored to proven unlawful conduct)