Crystal Thompson v. Andrew Dill, 930 F.3d 1008

Background

On May 4, 2016, Trooper Andrew Dill responded to a domestic-disturbance call at Gerry and Crystal Thompson’s home; Gerry allegedly had assaulted Crystal and threatened to kill her if police came.
Deputy Darren Cheek engaged Gerry at the door and deployed a taser; Cheek and other officers then forced entry while Dill positioned outside and looked through the front door, seeing Crystal with blood and hearing commotion.
Gerry exited the house through a separate door and, according to Dill, moved his hands toward his waistband and turned back toward the house; Dill fired one shot without issuing a verbal warning, killing the unarmed Gerry.
Plaintiffs (Gerry’s family and Crystal) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and Missouri battery; Dill moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and official immunity.
The district court denied summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact about whether Dill reasonably perceived an immediate threat (precluding qualified immunity) and whether Dill acted with malice (precluding official immunity).
On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual disputes central to Dill’s claimed immunities and dismissed the appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dill is entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 excessive-force claim	Dill’s shooting was unreasonable and excessive because Gerry was unarmed and there is evidence questioning Dill’s account of Gerry reaching for his waistband	Dill reasonably (and permissibly) believed Gerry posed an immediate threat to officers/others when Gerry allegedly reached for his waistband and turned toward the house, justifying deadly force	Court dismissed appeal for lack of jurisdiction because genuine factual disputes about Gerry’s conduct (central to reasonableness) prevented appellate review of immunity at this stage
Whether Dill is entitled to official immunity on state-law battery claim	Dill acted maliciously or in bad faith by shooting immediately without warning and contrary to training	Dill was performing a discretionary police function (using deadly force in an arrest/defense context) and thus is protected by official immunity absent malice	Court dismissed appeal for lack of jurisdiction because disputed facts (timing, warnings, whether Dill’s account is true) leave open a jury determination on malice

Key Cases Cited

Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494 (8th Cir.) (qualified immunity two-step and split-second judgment context)
Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961 (8th Cir.) (deadly-force standard when suspect is unarmed but officer reasonably perceives threat)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (Graham reasonableness standard for use of force under Fourth Amendment)
Raines v. Counseling Assocs. Inc., 883 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir.) (limits on appellate jurisdiction over denials of qualified immunity; exception where record plainly forecloses dispute)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (U.S.) (video evidence can plainly contradict a plaintiff’s version and justify reversal of denial of qualified immunity)
Zubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568 (8th Cir.) (list of relevant factors for assessing objective reasonableness of force)
Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990 (8th Cir.) (deadly force may be justified even if suspect is unarmed when officer’s belief is objectively reasonable)
Ellison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.) (deadly force not justified if officer’s belief of immediate threat is not objectively reasonable)
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (U.S.) (appellate jurisdictional limits: courts may not review denials of summary judgment based on factual disputes)
Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974 (8th Cir.) (scope of appellate review limited to legal issues for immunity doctrines; discussions of official immunity and malice)
Seiner v. Drenon, 304 F.3d 810 (8th Cir.) (drawing and firing a weapon is generally a discretionary act protected by official immunity)