19 F.4th 538
1st Cir.2021Background
- Plaintiff was a tenant in the Manuel A. Pérez public housing project in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which is owned/overseen by Puerto Rico housing authorities and managed under contract by private defendant Management Administration Services Corp. (MAS).
- After seeking a rent adjustment, the tenant disputed alleged arrears and MAS commenced eviction proceedings in July 2017; the tenant contested the eviction.
- While eviction proceedings were pending, MAS provided a list of vacant units to the Puerto Rico Police under a purported policy/agreement; police subsequently raided the tenant’s apartment, causing claimed emotional and medical harms to the tenant and her autistic child.
- Plaintiff sued MAS and its administrator under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims) and asserted state-law emotional-distress claims; federal claims were premised solely on the theory that MAS performed a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state (the public function test).
- The district court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding the amended complaint lacked factual allegations plausibly showing MAS performed a historically exclusive state function; the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
- The First Circuit affirmed, holding the complaint’s conclusory labels and statutory citations did not plausibly establish that administration/provision of low-income housing is an exclusive sovereign function.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MAS is a state actor under § 1983 via the public-function test | MAS performed the state’s exclusive function of administering public housing, so its actions are attributable to the state | Provision/administration of low-income housing is not historically exclusive to government; plaintiff pleaded only conclusory labels and statutory language | Court held plaintiff failed to plausibly allege MAS performed a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State," so no state action under the public-function test; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the complaint met Rule 8(a)/12(b)(6) pleading standards | Allegations that PRPHA contracted MAS and that MAS managed public housing suffice to state a claim | Complaint is conclusory and lacks factual predicate tying MAS’s conduct to historical exclusivity; Twombly/Iqbal require plausible facts | Court held Iqbal/Twombly apply; conclusory assertions and labels are insufficient to survive dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading requires plausible factual content, not mere conclusions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (public-function test requires the function be traditionally exclusive to the State)
- Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-town analogue where private actor performed virtually all municipal functions)
- West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (private physician providing medical care in prisons can be state actor)
- Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private management of a municipal park could be state action in special circumstances)
- Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (fact-intensive inquiry into state involvement in private conduct)
- Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (private action can be "fairly attributable" to the State)
- Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2011) (describes three tests for private-party state action: public function, state compulsion, nexus/joint action)
- Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private educational institution not a state actor under public-function test)
- Jarvis v. Village Gun Shop, Inc., 805 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015) (rejection of public-function theory for private warehousing of state-confiscated weapons)