356 F. Supp. 3d 831
D. Alaska2018Background
- Plaintiffs (CLIA and CLIA Alaska) are trade associations for cruise lines that call at Juneau; defendants are the City & Borough of Juneau (CBJ) and the City Manager. Plaintiffs seek prospective relief (no refunds) challenging two local fees: a $5 Marine Passenger Fee (MPF) and a $3 Port Development Fee (PDF).
- MPF and PDF are assessed on vessel owners/agents and raise several million dollars annually; revenues are placed in discrete funds and used for municipal department allocations, operating grants to third parties, and capital projects (e.g., Seawalk, 16B dock project).
- Plaintiffs assert (1) Tonnage Clause violation, (2) violation of Section 5(b) of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (RHAA), (3) Commerce Clause, and (4) Supremacy Clause / §1983 claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief limiting future use of MPF/PDF revenue.
- Defendants moved for a law‑of‑the‑case ruling and cross‑moved for summary judgment, arguing fees may fund services that benefit passengers (even if also used by the public), and raising affirmative defenses (statute of limitations, exhaustion, waiver, laches, estoppel).
- The court treated purely legal questions first and issued rulings: (a) under both the Tonnage Clause and RHAA §5(b) fees may only lawfully fund services to the vessel itself (passenger‑only benefits are impermissible); (b) incidental public use does not invalidate a legitimate vessel service; (c) plaintiffs may bring a private RHAA §5(b) claim; and (d) plaintiffs are entitled to prospective relief limitations but not to refunds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether tonnage‑type fees may be used to fund services that benefit passengers only | MPF/PDF use for many passenger‑oriented projects is unlawful under the Tonnage Clause | Fees may fund passenger benefits; labeling as charges for services suffices | Fees imposed on vessels may only be used for services to the vessel; passenger‑only expenditures are unconstitutional under the Tonnage Clause (prospective relief only) |
| Whether incidental public availability defeats a vessel‑service justification | If passengers also benefit, fees are improper | Services that benefit both vessels and the public can still be lawful vessel services | Incidental or parallel use by the public does not invalidate lawful services to a vessel; public availability is not dispositive |
| Whether RHAA §5(b) creates a private cause of action enforceable by plaintiffs | §5(b) enforces the same limits as Tonnage Clause and is enforceable by private parties | Congress did not intend to create a private right under §5(b) | Court implies a private right exists under §5(b) and applies the same vessel‑service limitation as the Tonnage Clause |
| Defenses: statute of limitations, exhaustion, waiver, laches, estoppel, and preemption | Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely/failure to exhaust/waived/estopped and preempted by federal law | CBJ says delay and prior acquiescence bar relief; also asserts Supremacy Clause defense | Prospective claims are not time‑barred; exhaustion and waiver/estoppel/quasi‑estoppel defenses fail as to forward‑looking relief; laches does not bar prospective injunctive relief in this case; MPF/PDF are not preempted by RHAA (no impossibility/conflict) |
Key Cases Cited
- Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009) (Tonnage Clause prohibits charges that function as port entry taxes and permits charges that are reasonable compensation for services to vessels)
- Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877) (wharfage and compensation for use of constructed facilities are permissible fees)
- Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261 (1935) (Tonnage Clause reaches charges that impose a charge for the privilege of entering or trading in a port)
- Southern S.S. Co. v. Port Wardens, 73 U.S. 31 (1867) (fees levied absent a service to vessels violate the Tonnage Clause)
- Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 805 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2015) (distinguishing taxes from reasonable compensation for services and explaining why service charges facilitate commerce)
- Bridgeport & Port Jefferson Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport Port Auth., 567 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (fees used for projects that do not benefit paying vessels may violate Tonnage Clause principles)
- California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (analysis of private cause of action under the Rivers and Harbors Act and use of the Cort factors)
- Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Board of Health of State of Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455 (1886) (quarantine fees held permissible as compensation for services to vessels)