Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Undеr review here is a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that private parties may sue under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 to enforce § 10 of that Act. An environmental organization and two private citizens (hereafter respondents)
I
The California Water Project consists of a seriеs of water storage and transportation facilities designed primarily to transport water from the relatively moist climate of northern California to the more arid central and southern portions of the State. The water which will be used by the CWP is initially stored behind dams on the Sacramento River and, as needed, released into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The CWP then diverts a quantity of this water from the Delta and directs it into canals and aqueducts which will carry it south. The project has both federal and state compоnents. The federal component, the Central Valley Project, is designed in part to provide a constant source of water for irrigation to the Central Valley of California. Water for this project is diverted from the Delta by the Tracy Pumping Plant into the 115-mile Delta-Mendota Canal which transports the water to the Mendota Pool in California’s Central Valley. The State Water Project supplies water to both central and southern California by way of the California Aqueduct. Water for this project is drawn from the Delta by thе Delta Pumping Plant and deposited in the
Under the present system the quality of water captured in the north and released into the Delta may be degraded by intruding salt waters from the Pacific Ocean. As a consequence the water which is diverted from the Delta to the Delta-Mendota Canal or the California Aqueduct is potentially of a lesser quality than is the water which is transported to the Delta from storage facilities in the north аnd from there deposited in the Delta. The State of California has proposed the construction of a 42-mile Peripheral Canal along the eastern edge of the Delta area, which would avoid any mixing of the water from the north with the saline water of the Delta. Instead of depositing water in the Delta, the canal would carry high quality water directly to the Tracy and Delta Pumping Plants.
Respondents commenced the present action in 1971 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 P. Supp. 610 (1975). Named as defendants were the various federal and state officials who administer the agencies responsible for overseeing the operation, construction, and regulation of the CWP facilities in question.
The District Court concluded that respondents could avail themselves of a “private cause of action” to enforce § 10 of the Act, and ruled on the merits that approval of the Corps of Engineers was required by § 10 for the Tracy and Delta Pumping Plants and the Peripheral Canal. Sierra, Club v. Morton, supra. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that a private cause of action to enforce the Act existed. Sierra Club v. Andrus,
II
Cort v. Ash,
“First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted/ . . . —that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate tо infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?”422 U. S., at 78 .
Combined, these four factors present the relevant inquiries to pursue in answering the recurring question of implied causes of action. Cases subsequent to Cort have explained that the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, see Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu,
Under Cort, the initial consideration is whether the plaintiff is a -member of a class for “ 'whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.’ ” Cort v. Ash, supra, at 78, 80-82; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at 569-570; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 689-694. Without analyzing either the language or legislative history of the Act, the Court of Appeals here concluded that the Act was designed for the especial benefit of private parties who may suffer “special injury” caused by an unauthorized obstruc
In ascertaining this intent, the first consideration is the language of the Act. Here, the statute states no more than a general proscription of certain activities; it does not unmistakably focus on any particular class of bеneficiaries whose welfare Congress intended to further. Such language does not indicate an intent to provide for private rights of action. “There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX [of the Education Amendments of 1972] with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practiсes.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 690-693; see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at 569; Cort v. Ash, supra, at 80-82. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act is the kind of general ban which carries with it no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondents have identified anything in the legislative history suggesting that § 10 was created for the especial benefit of a particular class. On the contrary, the legislative history supports the view that
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is no “indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one.” Cort v. Ash,
Ill
Petitioner the State of California urges that we reach the merits of these cases — whether permits are required for the state water allocation projects — regardless of our disposition of the рrivate-cause-of-action issue. This we decline to do. Our ruling that there is no private cause of action permitting respondents to commence this action disposes of the cases: we cannot consider the merits of a claim which Congress has not authorized respondents to raise.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
The Sierra Club is a nonprofit California corporation; Hank Schramm is a commеrcial fisherman active in the San Francisco Bay and Pacific Ocean; and William Dixon is a Saeramento-San Joaquin Delta landowner. See
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 provides:
“The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans*290 recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.” 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U. S. C. § 403.
The federal defendants were the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Engineers of the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Division Engineer of the Corps’ South Pacific Division. The state defendants were the Secretary for Resources and the Director оf the Department of Water Resources.
According to affidavits filed in 1974 in support of motions to intervene, Kern County Water Agency has contracted to purchase up to 1,153,000 acre-feet annually, which is resold primarily to agricultural
Judge Tang wrote separately to explain why the conclusion that the Tracy Pumping Plant had been authorized by Congress did not conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat,
In addition, § 12 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 406, provides criminal penalties for violations of the provisions .of various sections of the Act, including the provisions of § 10; and, § 17 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §413, provides that “[t]he Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings necessary to enforcе the provisions of [§ 10].” The creation of one explicit mode of enforcement is not dispositive of congressional intent with respect to other complementary remedies. See Cort v. Ash,
Respondents suggest that the legislative history of the Act must be read in light of the historical context during which the measure was being considered. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
For both of these positions respondents rely heavily upon Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
Equally unavailing is respondents’ assertion that Wheeling Bridge stands for the broad proposition that if Congress legislated in this area, any prohibition оf obstructions would automatically support a private right of action. This position is extrapolated from discussions of the law of nuisance in both Wheeling Bridge, supra, at 604-607 and the subsequent Gilman v. Philadelphia,
The most that may be legitimately concluded as to legislative understanding of the law preceding the enactment of this statute is that Congress was aware that the Supreme Court had held that there was no federal law which empowered anyone to contest obstructions to navigable rivers. See 21 Cong. Rec. 8604r-8607 (1890). We cannot assume from legislative silence on private rights of action, that Congress anticipated that a general regulatory prohibition of obstructions to navigable streams would provide an automatic basis for a private remedy in the nature of common-law nuisance. The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 was no doubt in part a legislative response to the Willamette decision. But there is nothing to suggest that that response was intended to do anything more than empower the Federal Government to respond to obstructions on navigable rivers. The broad view supported by respondents is without support.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
In 1888 this Court reversed a decree enjoining the construction of a bridge over a navigable river. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch,
In these cases, I believe the Court correctly concludes that application of the Cort v. Ash analysis indicates that no private cause of action is available. I think it is more important to adhere to the analytical approach the Court has adopted than to base my vote on my own opinion about what Congress probably assumed in 1890. Cf. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Asm.,
The Willamette Court explained the issue presented as follows:
“The gravamen of the bill was, the obstruction of the navigation of the Willamette River by the defendants, by the erection of the bridge which they were engaged in building. The defendants pleaded the authority of the state legislature for the erection of the bridge. The court held thаt the work was not done in conformity with the requirements of the state law; but whether it were or not, it lacked the assent of Congress, which assent the court held was necessary in view of that provision in the act of Congress admitting Oregon as a State, which has been referred to. The court held that this provision of the act was tantamount to a declaration that the navigation of the Willamette River should not be obstructed or interfered with; and that any such obstruction or interference, without the consent of Congress, whether by state sanction or not, was a violation of the act of Congress; and that the obstruction complained of was in violation of said act. And this is the principal and important question in this case, namely, whether the erection of a bridge over the Willamette River at Portland was a violation of said act of Congress. If it was not, if it could not be, if the act did not apply to obstructions of this kind, then the case did not arise under the constitution or laws of the United States, unless under some other law referred to in the bill.”125 U. S., at 7-8 .
The then-current edition of Coolеy’s treatise on the Law of Torts 790 (2d ed. 1888) described the common-law remedy for breach of a statutory duty in this way:
“[W]hen the duty imposed by statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of individuals, the common law, when an individual is injured by a breach of the duty, will supply a remedy, if the statute gives none.”
A few years earlier this Court quoted with approval an opinion by Judge Cooley in support of its holding that a railroad’s breach of a stat
See Anonymous, 6 Mod. 27, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (1703) (pеr Holt, C. J.); 2 E. Coke, Institutes on the Laws of England 55 (6th ed. 1681); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *23, *51, *109, *123; 1 Comyns’ Digest 433-445 (1822); Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854). In Comyns’ Digest, at 442, the rule was broadly stated:
“So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompence of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.”
As Justice Frankfurter stated in dissent in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co.,
“Courts, unlike administrative agencies, are organs with historic antecedents which bring with them well-defined powers. They do not require expliсit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks,281 U. S. 548 ; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation,300 U. S. 515 ; Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282. A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a formulated sanction. When Congress has ‘left the matter at large for judicial determination,’ our function is to decide what remedies are appropriate in the light of the statutory language and purpose and of the traditional modes by which courts compel performance of legal obligations. See Board of Comm’rs v. United States,308 U. S. 343 , 351. If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate thе purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby,241 U. S. 33 ; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,323 U. S. 192 ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,323 U. S. 210 ; cf. De Lima v. Bidwell,182 U. S. 1 .”
In a separate concurrence in this case, four Members of the Court have undertaken to explain the legal effect of certain “implied right of action” opinions decided more recently than Cort v. Ash. As The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, Justice Rehnquist, and I noted in our separate opinion in University of California Regents v. Bakke,
Concurrence Opinion
with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, and Justice Powell join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree completely with the conclusion of the Court that in these cases “Congress was not concerned with the rights of individuals” and that “[i]t is not surprising, therefore, that there is no ‘indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create ... a [private] remedy or to deny one.’ ” Ante, at 295.
“As recently emphasized, the focus of the inquiry is on whether Congress intended to create a remedy. Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu,450 U. S., at 771-772 ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,444 U. S., at 23-24 ; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, [442 U. S.], at 575-576. The federal judiciary will nоt engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.”
My only difference, and the difference which leads me to write this separate concurrence in the judgment, is that I think the Court’s opinion places somewhat more emphasis on Cort v. Ash,
But in these cases, I am happy to agree with the Court that there is no implied right of action because “[t]he language of the statute and its legislative history do not suggest that the Act was intended to create federal rights for the especial benefit of a class of persons,” ante, at 297-298, and because there is no “evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a private remedy.” Ante, at 298.