Cruickshank v. United States, 505 F.Supp.3d 1127

Cruickshank was charged with two counts of methamphetamine distribution and one count of felon-in-possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); he pleaded guilty to one distribution count and the felon-in-possession count and received concurrent 72-month sentences.
His plea agreement recited elements for the § 922(g)(1) offense but did not include an explicit mens rea element that he knew he belonged to a prohibited category; the agreement included a broad collateral-attack waiver.
After the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States (2019), holding that § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he belonged to a prohibited category, Cruickshank filed a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction.
The Government conceded Rehaif announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive and that the § 2255 motion was timely, but argued the motion should be rejected under the concurrent-sentence doctrine, the plea waiver, or procedural default.
The court rejected the concurrent-sentence doctrine, declined to decide waiver because procedural default proved dispositive, and held Cruickshank could not show cause and actual prejudice to excuse his procedural default; it denied the § 2255 motion.
The court granted a certificate of appealability limited to whether a Rehaif error in a guilty-plea case is a structural error.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether to apply the concurrent-sentence doctrine to dismiss the § 2255 motion	Doctrine should not bar review of collateral consequences	Vacating the § 922(g) conviction would not change time served because sentences are concurrent	Court declined to apply doctrine and reached other issues (citing DeBright)
Whether the plea agreement waives Cruickshank's right to bring this § 2255 motion	Plea was not knowing and intelligent because mens rea element for status was omitted, so waiver is inapplicable	Plea waiver bars collateral attack; plea not shown defective	Court did not resolve waiver because procedural default resolved the case
Whether Cruickshank can overcome procedural default of a Rehaif claim by showing cause and actual prejudice or that the error was structural	Rehaif created a new rule not reasonably available earlier; omission prevented development of mens rea defenses; error is structural	Pre-Rehaif law made the issue reasonably available; record shows defendant knew his felon status; Rehaif error is not structural	Court held Cruickshank failed to show cause or actual prejudice and that Rehaif error is not structural; § 2255 denied; COA granted only on structural-error question

Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (holds § 922(g) requires proof defendant knew he belonged to a prohibited category)
DeBright v. United States, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejects concurrent-sentence doctrine as a discretionary means to avoid review on appeal)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (limits collateral attack on guilty pleas; voluntariness and intelligence normally must be challenged on direct review)
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (establishes cause standard for excusing procedural default)
Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (explains heightened cause-and-prejudice standard for collateral review)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (most constitutional errors are subject to harmless-error analysis; structural errors are rare)
Enslin v. United States, 327 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2003) (pre-Rehaif Ninth Circuit precedent treating scienter as applying only to possession element)