Crowley v. Faison, 2:21-cv-00778

Background

An impersonator sent three racist emails purportedly from Karra Crowley to Black Lives Matter Sacramento (BLM) April 25–26, 2021.
BLM (through Tanya Faison) posted the emails to BLM Sacramento’s Facebook page, identified Crowley and her business, and urged followers to make her "famous."
Crowley promptly denied authorship, asked for removal, and BLM later posted that her "information has been verified;" the posts remained up.
The Facebook posts triggered harassment, violent threats, media attention, and alleged business harm to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs sued for libel; defendants moved to strike under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute and to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); plaintiffs moved to amend to add the alleged real sender and an IIED claim.
The court denied the anti‑SLAPP motion and the dismissal motion, finding plaintiffs showed a probability of prevailing and that § 230 and common‑interest privilege defenses were not dispositive; leave to amend was granted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of anti‑SLAPP / prima facie showing	Crowley: posts are false, and timing/verification infer reckless disregard; plaintiff shows minimal merit	Defs: Facebook posts are protected speech on a public issue; anti‑SLAPP requires dismissal	Denied. Court found plaintiffs met minimal‑merit showing (actual‑malice inference) and anti‑SLAPP did not require dismissal
Actual malice standard for libel	Crowley: timing of posts, quick "verification," and refusal to remove after denial support reckless disregard	Defs: no evidence of actual malice; mere publication of third‑party content not reckless	Held: sufficient factual allegations and inferences exist to permit finding of actual malice for anti‑SLAPP burden
CDA §230 immunity	Crowley: emails were sent directly to BLM (not posted for internet use), plus defendants added commentary/verification and refused removal	Defs: they are users of an interactive service and posted third‑party content; §230 bars liability	Held: §230 immunity not dispositive on pleadings; facts permit inference that defendant participated in or altered content and that emails were not provided for internet posting, so §230 may not shield them here
Common‑interest privilege	Crowley: defendants lacked reasonable basis and acted with malice; privilege should not shield deliberate/reckless publication	Defs: posting to interested community about matters of concern is privileged	Held: privilege not shown on facts; even if applicable, alleged malice would defeat it
Motion to amend (add alleged sender and IIED claim)	Crowley: discovered real sender after filing; IIED claims supported by posts + subsequent threats	Defs: oppose as moot or prejudicial	Held: Granted. Amendment permitted; IIED claim plausibly pleaded given alleged outrageous conduct and consequences

Key Cases Cited

Metabolife Intern. Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) (anti‑SLAPP burden and plaintiff minimal‑merit standard)
City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69 (Cal. 2002) (definition and focus of anti‑SLAPP protected activity)
Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53 (Cal. 2002) (two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Cal. 2002) (focus on defendant’s activity underlying claim)
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (actual malice requires reckless disregard; proof by inference)
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (§ 230 immunity requires content was provided for internet use)
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (broad § 230 immunity for third‑party content/providers)
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33 (Cal. 2006) (California Supreme Court on § 230 and publisher liability)
Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683 (Cal. 2007) (malice defeats common‑interest privilege)
Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal.3d 711 (Cal. 1989) (scope of common‑interest privilege vs. matters of public interest)