332 P.3d 215
Mont.2014Background
- VanDyke was admitted to the Montana Bar in October 2005, elected inactive Bar status in March 2007 while practicing in other states, and was restored to active status in January 2013.
- He filed to run for Montana Supreme Court in March 2014; plaintiffs (Cross et al.) sued to remove him from the ballot, alleging he was not "admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior" to election as required by Mont. Const. art. VII, § 9(1).
- The District Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding inactive status meant VanDyke was not "admitted to the practice of law" for the five-year eligibility period.
- VanDyke appealed; the Montana Supreme Court reviewed constitutional text, State Bar By‑Laws, and 1972 Constitutional Convention history to discern framers’ intent.
- The Court concluded that "admitted to the practice of law in Montana" refers to admission (licensure) rather than continuous active practice, and reversed the District Court, allowing VanDyke to remain on the ballot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary inactive Bar status disqualifies a candidate from meeting the Constitution's requirement of being "admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years" before election | Cross: Inactive status prevents practicing in Montana and thus is not equivalent to being "admitted to the practice" for eligibility purposes | VanDyke: "Admitted to the practice" means licensed/admitted by the Court; active practice is not required by Article VII, § 9(1) | Court: Reversed District Court; admission (licensure) suffices even if the lawyer was on inactive status for part of the five years |
| Whether Article VI’s explicit "active practice" requirement for Attorney General implies a similar active-practice requirement for judicial candidates | Cross: The framers intended judicial candidates to have Montana practice experience; convention remarks support an actual-practice expectation | VanDyke: Constitution separates qualifications; omission of "active practice" for judicial office is deliberate and meaningful | Court: The distinct language across Articles shows framers intended no identical "active practice" requirement for Supreme Court Justices |
| Whether State Bar By‑Laws (adopted under Court authority) control the constitutional meaning of "admitted to the practice of law" | Cross (and dissent): By‑Laws define who may practice; inactive members are barred from practice, so they are not "admitted to the practice" for eligibility | VanDyke: By‑Laws regulate practice and active membership but do not withdraw admission/licensure conferred by the Court | Court: By‑Laws do not erase court admission; disciplinary rules and By‑Laws presume admission distinct from active membership, so constitutional admission remains satisfied |
| Whether legislative or jurisprudential concerns about permitting long-inactive attorneys to run outweigh constitutional text and convention intent | Cross: Permitting inactive attorneys could let candidates without Montana practice or experience run | VanDyke: Presumption in favor of voter choice and plain text favor eligibility; voters decide fitness | Court: Recognizes potential consequences but limits decision to constitutional text and convention intent; leaves voter choice intact |
Key Cases Cited
- Reichert v. State, 365 Mont. 92 (2012) (constitutional qualifications for justices are governed exclusively by Art. VII, § 9)
- State ex rel. Racicot v. District Court, 243 Mont. 379 (1990) (resort to framers’ intent where constitutional language is ambiguous)
- Shapiro v. Jefferson County, 278 Mont. 109 (1996) (liberal construction of eligibility phrase "admitted to the practice of law" in a related statutory context)
- In re M.N., 362 Mont. 186 (2011) (use of ordinary meaning in construing constitutional phrases)
- Application of Montana Bar Ass'n President, 163 Mont. 523 (1974) (Court’s unification order initiating the unified State Bar under the Court’s constitutional rulemaking authority)
- In re the Unified Bar of Montana, 165 Mont. 1 (1975) (adoption/approval of State Bar Constitution and By‑Laws under Court authority)
- Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (interpretive canon: inclusion/omission in adjacent provisions is meaningful)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (same interpretive canon cited for textual distinctions)