496 P.3d 83
Utah2021Background
- Wasatch Peaks Ranch (WPR) applied to rezone ~11,000 acres in Morgan County; the County adopted an ordinance approving the rezoning and development agreement.
- Five Morgan County registered voters (appellants) submitted a citizen-referendum application; the County Clerk rejected it for not containing a residency “certification” and a copy of the challenged ordinance.
- Appellants filed a petition in district court challenging the Clerk’s rejection; WPR intervened and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
- WPR relied on Utah Code § 20A-7-602.8(4)(a), which directs a sponsor to the Utah Supreme Court by extraordinary writ “if possible,” or to a district court only if the sponsor is “prohibited from pursuing” such a writ.
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning appellants were not prohibited from pursuing a writ merely because they chose not to file in the Supreme Court.
- The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure defines when a sponsor is “prohibited from pursuing” an extraordinary writ and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Croft) | Defendant's Argument (WPR/County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether district court has jurisdiction under §20A-7-602.8(4)(a) when sponsor did not seek an extraordinary writ | Statute is ambiguous; Rule 19 governs whether a sponsor is "prohibited" from pursuing a writ, and if sponsor cannot meet Rule 19, they may proceed in district court | "If possible" means a sponsor must first seek a writ in the Supreme Court so long as filing a petition is physically possible | Court: statute ambiguous; interpret it in harmony with Rule 19—sponsor is "prohibited" when they cannot satisfy Rule 19, so appellants properly sued in district court |
| 2) Whether reading §602.8(4)(a) to require Supreme Court filing every time raises constitutional or surplusage problems | Interpreting "if possible" as informed by Rule 19 avoids intruding on the Supreme Court’s control of extraordinary writs and gives effect to subsection (ii) | Insists the statute requires seeking extraordinary writs first whenever filing is technically possible | Court: WPR’s reading risks unconstitutional intrusion on the Supreme Court’s original-jurisdiction discretion and would render subsection (ii) meaningless; avoid that construction |
| 3) Whether appellants could have met Rule 19’s threshold (i.e., show district court remedy impractical or inappropriate) | No exigent timeline or circumstances made district court inadequate; therefore Rule 19 could not be satisfied | Appellants were not "prohibited" merely because they didn’t file in the Supreme Court; they could have attempted it | Court: appellants could not satisfy Rule 19 (no showing district court inadequate), so they were not required to file in the Supreme Court |
| 4) Alternate merits defenses to the referendum application (certification, notarization, timeliness) | Signatures and addresses may suffice for residency certification; the notarization and timeliness facts are disputed | Application lacked required residency certification and copy of ordinance; Croft’s notarizations invalid; submission may have been after the 5 p.m. deadline | Court: declined to resolve merits on appeal; remanded for district court to develop facts and apply law on certification, notary-validity, and timeliness |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Cox, 387 P.3d 1040 (Utah 2017) (legislature may not enlarge or abridge Supreme Court’s original writ jurisdiction)
- Anderson v. Provo City, 387 P.3d 1014 (Utah 2016) (petitioners to Supreme Court must meet Rule 19 showing that district court remedy is impractical or inappropriate)
- Carpenter v. Riverton City, 103 P.3d 127 (Utah 2004) (statute allowing direct Supreme Court petitions is permissive, not exclusive, absent Rule 19 justification)
- State v. Hatfield, 462 P.3d 330 (Utah 2020) (use ordinary meaning/dictionaries in statutory interpretation)
- State ex rel. Robinson v. Durand, 104 P. 760 (Utah 1908) (Supreme Court’s original writ jurisdiction cannot be altered by statute)