905 N.W.2d 344
S.D.2017Background
- Croell Redi-Mix (Croell) owns Perli Quarry, a 40-acre sand/gravel mining operation in Pennington County, operating since the 1970s; Croell acquired it in 2015 and sought to expand operations.
- Pennington County zoning designates the area A-1 General Agriculture; PCZO § 205(B) lists mining and extraction as allowed uses but PCZO § 507 governs permitting (construction permits and a separate mining permit regime).
- Croell applied for a construction permit under PCZO § 507(A); the Planning Director and Planning Commission approved with conditions; opponents appealed to the Board of Commissioners.
- The Board reversed the Director’s approval (4–1); Croell appealed to the circuit court under SDCL ch. 7-8. The circuit court reversed the Board and ordered reinstatement of the permit.
- The Supreme Court reviewed three issues: (1) whether the Board could hear the appeal, (2) whether the proposed mining could be authorized by a construction permit, and (3) whether the Board’s decision was arbitrary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Board properly entertained the appeal from the Planning Director | Croell: appellants lacked standing under PCZO §507(A)(7)(f); no individualized injury | Board: §507(A)(7)(f) permits review by any person affected; judicial standing rules don’t constrain administrative review | Board properly entertained the appeal; appellants were “affected” and statute governs right to appeal |
| Whether Croell’s proposed mining could be authorized by a construction permit | Croell: mining/extraction is a permitted use in A-1 under §205(B) and historical practice excused a mining permit for long‑standing operations | Board: §507(B) unambiguously requires a mining permit for extraction over 100 cubic yards; construction permits cannot authorize such extraction | Held for Board: §507(B) unambiguously forbids extraction >100 cubic yards without a mining permit; construction permit was improper |
| Whether the Board’s reversal was arbitrary / unsupported by substantial evidence | Croell/circuit court: Board’s decision was arbitrary, review should be limited to erosion/stormwater conditions and evidence of harm was insubstantial | Board: decision applied the ordinance; denial rested on correct legal interpretation that a mining permit was required | Court reversed circuit court: Board’s action was lawful because the circuit court based arbitrariness finding on an erroneous legal interpretation of §507 |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennington Cnty. v. Moore, 525 N.W.2d 257 (S.D. 1994) (prior invalidation of county zoning led to recognition of legal nonconforming uses)
- Atkinson v. City of Pierre, 706 N.W.2d 791 (S.D. 2005) (discusses deference to administrative construction of ordinances in context)
- Wegner Auto Co. v. Ballard, 353 N.W.2d 57 (S.D. 1984) (courts may give weight to administrators’ interpretation but are not bound if ordinance is clear)
- Cable v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 769 N.W.2d 817 (S.D. 2009) (judicial standing/"aggrieved" requirement for appeals to circuit court under SDCL 7-8-27)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (framework for judicial review of agency interpretations: give effect to unambiguous text; if ambiguous, defer to reasonable agency construction)
