198 F. Supp. 3d 540
D. Md.2016Background
- Plaintiff Cricket Group (Nevada corp., principal place Garrett County, MD) alleges Highmark (Pennsylvania corp., principal place Pittsburgh) breached a November 2013 consulting contract by failing to pay for services.
- Cricket filed suit in D. Md.; Highmark moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; Cricket amended and jurisdictional discovery was permitted.
- Cricket contends Maryland courts have both specific and general jurisdiction over Highmark based on communications, services performed (remotely), Highmark’s business with Maryland residents, and subsidiary activity/licensing.
- Highmark has no physical presence in Maryland (no offices, property, employees, registration); meetings occurred in Pennsylvania; contract selects Pennsylvania law.
- Court found Cricket’s contacts insufficient to show purposeful availment (specific jurisdiction) or that Highmark is essentially at home in Maryland (general jurisdiction).
- Rather than dismissing, the court transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Maryland has specific personal jurisdiction over Highmark | Highmark purposefully directed activities to Maryland by contracting and communicating with Cricket and receiving services provided from Maryland | Highmark’s contacts (emails/phones) were remote; meetings and performance occurred in Pennsylvania; choice-of-law selects Pennsylvania | No — contacts not a "substantial connection"; purposeful availment not shown |
| Whether Maryland has general personal jurisdiction over Highmark | Highmark’s licensing, advertising, and business with Maryland residents render it "at home" in Maryland | Highmark is incorporated and headquartered in Pennsylvania; subsidiary contacts cannot be imputed without showing control | No — contacts not continuous/systematic; not essentially at home in Maryland |
| Whether subsidiary contacts/licensing can impute jurisdiction to parent | Subsidiary activity and licensing in Maryland indicate Highmark’s presence | Parent-subsidiary separateness; no evidence of parent control over subsidiary | No — Cricket offered no evidence to pierce corporate separateness |
| Whether transfer is appropriate instead of dismissal | Transfer would serve justice and avoid re-filing; forum selected by contract is Pennsylvania | Highmark requested transfer; jurisdiction proper in W.D. Pa. | Transfer granted to W.D. Pa. under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (contracts alone do not automatically establish minimum contacts; require individualized inquiry)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (general jurisdiction requires defendant to be essentially at home in forum)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (foundation of minimum contacts/due process analysis)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (general jurisdiction requires continuous and systematic contacts)
- Perdue Foods LLC v. BRF S.A., 814 F.3d 185 (4th Cir. 2016) (MD long-arm coextensive with constitutional limits)
- Diamond Healthcare of Ohio, Inc. v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, 229 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2000) (specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the cause of action)
- Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2005) (subsidiary contacts not imputed to parent absent evidence of control)
- Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (framework for purposeful availment and prongs for specific jurisdiction)
- Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1993) (prima facie showing standard in pretrial jurisdictional determinations)