Creese v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 2016-2440

Creese was a DOC recruit (Oct–Dec 2013); Dr. Willie Barr was a training supervisor who repeatedly made comments about Creese’s appearance and masculinity and treated him differently than other recruits.
Creese excelled and was selected as class speaker; he brought a personal flash drive to prepare his speech and later left it in a DOC computer. The drive contained photos including non-explicit nude photos of Creese.
Two weeks after starting at the jail, Creese was escorted from roll call and terminated for the flash-drive incident without receiving prior demerits or warnings that DOC policy usually required.
Creese filed an OHR complaint and obtained an EEOC right-to-sue letter; he then sued DOC under Title VII (gender stereotyping), sued Dr. Barr individually under § 1983 for Equal Protection, and asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against both.
The court denied dismissal of the Title VII and § 1983 claims as plausibly alleging sex‑stereotyping discrimination and animus by a supervisor, but dismissed the IIED claim as legally insufficient and for failure to give written notice to the Mayor under D.C. Code § 12‑309.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DOC violated Title VII by firing Creese based on gender stereotyping	Creese alleges he was perceived as "insufficiently masculine" and terminated for that reason; other "manly" recruits who violated the same policy were not fired	DOC contends facts do not show disparate treatment, nexus between comments and termination, or sex-based motive	Denied dismissal: complaint plausibly alleges sex‑stereotyping discrimination by supervisor and employer liability under Title VII
Whether Dr. Barr is liable under § 1983 for violating Equal Protection	Creese alleges Dr. Barr, acting under color of D.C. law, discharged him because of perceived insufficient masculinity; similarly situated males/females were treated differently	Barr argues complaint fails to show discriminatory intent or that he was the decisionmaker	Denied dismissal: allegations sufficient to plausibly allege discriminatory intent and action under color of law
Whether claims for IIED meet D.C. legal standard	Creese alleges harassment, public escort off premises, threats, and wrongful termination caused severe emotional distress	Defendants argue conduct does not rise to the "extreme and outrageous" threshold; also that Creese failed to provide § 12‑309 written notice to the Mayor	Granted dismissal: allegations do not meet D.C.'s demanding IIED standard and Creese failed to give required written notice to the Mayor

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (gender stereotyping can be actionable sex discrimination)
Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (striking sex‑stereotype based employment decisions)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal conclusions not accepted as true on motion to dismiss)
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (discriminatory intent standard for Equal Protection)
Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (discriminatory intent requires being a motivating factor)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (§ 1983 requires action under color of state law)
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (applying Equal Protection principles to D.C. via Fifth Amendment)
Purcell v. Thomas, 928 A.2d 699 (D.C. standard for extreme and outrageous conduct for IIED)
Morris v. WMATA, 702 F.2d 1037 (Title VII does not preempt § 1983 remedies for employees)