Creedon v. Haynes
90 Mass. App. Ct. 717
Mass. App. Ct.2016Background
- Parties divorced by judgment incorporating (but not merging) a 1995 separation agreement that required the father to designate the minor children as beneficiaries of his life insurance (father represented a $100,000 policy existed).
- No town life insurance policy existed; mother filed a contempt complaint in 2011 after learning the father never designated the children as beneficiaries.
- At trial the father claimed he had instead a line-of-duty death benefit naming the children; the trial judge continued to verify beneficiary status and, after the father failed to appear at the final day, found him in contempt and orally awarded the mother a $100,000 creditor claim against his estate (to be reduced by any life insurance naming the mother).
- The trial judge announced the decision on the record (transcript reflects ruling) but did not prepare or enter a separate judgment document on the docket as required by Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 58(a) and 79(a).
- A different judge later dismissed the contempt complaint as moot because the children were adults; the mother moved for relief under Rules 60(a)/(b), appealed after denial, and the Appeals Court vacated the dismissal and ordered judgment entered consistent with the trial judge’s decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court must enter a separate, written judgment under Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 58(a)/79(a) reflecting the trial judge's oral contempt ruling | Creedon argued the trial judge resolved contempt and she moved for entry of final judgment so the ruling would be recorded and docketed | Haynes did not oppose entry; later relied on children’s ages to argue mootness | Judgment must be recorded in a separate document and entered; vacate dismissal and direct entry consistent with the trial judge’s decision under Rule 58(a) |
| Whether the second judge could dismiss the contempt complaint as moot and reinterpret the separation agreement (contrary to the trial judge’s ruling) | Creedon argued the second judge improperly substituted her own substantively different interpretation and failed to treat the Rule 58(a) motion as ministerial | Haynes argued the obligation expired when children reached majority and thus dismissal was proper | The second judge erred: she lacked authority to resolve factual/contract issues decided at trial or treat a Rule 58(a) motion as substantive reconsideration without notice; her dismissal was vacated |
| Whether Rule 60 relief or other postjudgment relief remains available to defendant | Creedon sought Rule 60 relief to correct the dismissal; she appealed after denial | Haynes preserved an argument that he could seek relief from any contempt judgment under Rule 60(b) | Court noted its decision does not foreclose Haynes from moving for relief under Rule 60(b) with appropriate showing, but directed that judgment enter per trial judge |
Key Cases Cited
- Seaco Ins. Co. v. Barbosa, 435 Mass. 772 (contract ambiguity and use of extrinsic evidence is a factual question for trial)
- Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638 (extrinsic evidence may be used only after a court finds a contract is ambiguous)
- Zielinski v. Connecticut Valley Sanitary Waste Disposal, Inc., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 326 (strict compliance with Rule 58 separate-document requirement)
- Mullane v. Chambers, 333 F.3d 322 (First Circuit treating Rule 58 strictly; judgments must be separate, self-sufficient documents)