1 F.4th 371
5th Cir.2021Background:
- Plaintiff Scott Crawford uses a wheelchair due to multiple sclerosis and moved to Hinds County to be near family and care.
- He was summoned for jury duty twice before filing suit (2012 and 2015) and in each instance encountered architectural barriers at the Hinds County Courthouse (nonaccessible main entrance, heavy side door, inaccessible restrooms, no wheelchair space in benches, a step to the bench/jury box) and was excused.
- Crawford and disability advocates surveyed the courthouse and reported accessibility defects across most courtrooms; the county promised partial remediation but made no substantial changes by 2017.
- Crawford sued the county under Title II of the ADA for injunctive relief to remedy inaccessible jury-service facilities (damage claim under the Rehabilitation Act was settled separately).
- The district court found programmatic inaccessibility but held Crawford lacked Article III standing for injunctive relief as future exclusion from jury service was too speculative.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding Crawford had standing because the courthouse’s architectural barriers constitute a systemic exclusion and, given his prior summonses and the county’s size, there is a substantial risk he will be called and excluded again; the case was remanded.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing to seek injunctive relief (future injury imminence) | Crawford: twice previously summoned; Hinds County’s size makes future summons likely => substantial risk of future injury | County: future jury service and exclusion speculative; Herman shows slim chance requires denial | Reversed: standing exists — past summonses + courthouse-wide barriers make future injury substantially likely |
| Nature of exclusion — systemic vs episodic | Crawford: architectural defects across courtrooms amount to systemic exclusion under Title II | County: alleged exclusions episodic / judge-specific or isolated | Court: barriers are systemic; district court’s factual finding of inaccessibility stands (county conceded no clear error) |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1982) (standing for injunctive relief where a state rule systemically excluded a class from jury service)
- Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1992) (no standing where exclusion was episodic and tied to a particular judge)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (past wrongs alone do not establish the necessary threatened future injury for injunctive relief)
- Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (jury service is a public program/activity covered by Title II of the ADA)
- Hummel v. St. Joseph County Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2016) (denial of standing where plaintiffs offered no evidence they were likely to be called as jurors)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing ordinarily assessed based on facts at time complaint filed)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (threatened future injury must be imminent and present a substantial risk)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (Article III requires non-speculative, imminent threatened injury)
- Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020) (summary of Article III standing elements)