Craver, Anthony Carl, PD-0825-15

Background

On Feb. 8, 2012, Craver was observed shoplifting at Sears in Hulen Mall, handed an Xbox controller to a loss-prevention officer, then jumped ~20 feet over a second‑floor railing to the mall floor and landed on Kathleen Culp, who was seriously injured. Craver fled the scene.
Craver was indicted for aggravated robbery (recklessly causing serious bodily injury in the course of theft). The indictment alleged he jumped during business hours and landed “when there were persons in the area of his landing.”
At trial the court refused Craver’s requested lesser‑included theft instruction; the jury convicted him of robbery (a lesser‑included offense) and the court sentenced him as a habitual offender to 38 years. Craver appealed.
The Second Court of Appeals affirmed, holding: (1) the indictment sufficiently alleged recklessness by describing the circumstances; (2) the evidence permitted a finding of recklessness; (3) no theft instruction was required because no trial evidence established the value of the property; and (4) the jury charge was proper.
Craver petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals raising four main grounds: trial court’s denial of motion to quash indictment; legal sufficiency of evidence; denial of lesser‑included theft instruction; and jury‑charge error for not requiring proof of mens rea for the “persons in the area” element.

Issues

Issue	Craver's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Motion to quash indictment — whether indictment failed to plead mens rea for “persons in the area” element	Indictment omitted a culpable mental state for the circumstance that persons were in the landing area; thus it failed to require proof of awareness as to that element and should be quashed	Allegation that jump occurred during business hours and when persons were in landing area sufficiently describes circumstances supporting recklessness; detailed evidentiary facts are not required	Court of Appeals: indictment was sufficient; described circumstances gave adequate notice of reckless conduct
2. Sufficiency of evidence — whether the State proved recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt	No evidence showed Craver was aware persons were in the landing area or consciously disregarded that risk; evidence is legally insufficient	Circumstantial evidence (mall open, visible people below, Craver’s jump and flight) supports a reasonable inference of conscious disregard of risk	Court of Appeals: evidence sufficient to support jury’s finding of recklessness and robbery
3. Lesser‑included theft instruction — whether trial court erred by denying theft charge	A theft instruction was warranted (theft is a lesser‑included offense); omission harmed Craver because jury had only greater offense or acquittal	No trial evidence established the value of the stolen property, and value is an essential element to grade theft; without value evidence no theft instruction is proper	Court of Appeals: no error—no evidence of property value, so no rational basis to submit theft instruction
4. Jury charge mens rea — whether the charge failed to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each element	Charge omitted mens rea as to the circumstance “when there were persons in the area of his landing,” depriving Craver of due process and requiring reversal	Allegations and charge (describing circumstances) adequately conveyed recklessness; charge tracked statutory definition of recklessness	Court of Appeals: charge was proper and did not omit the required mens rea; no reversible charge error

Key Cases Cited

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1952) (mens rea is a fundamental principle of criminal law)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (legal sufficiency standard — view evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (analysis of conduct elements and requirement that culpable mental state apply to conduct/result/circumstances)
State v. Rodriguez, 339 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (examples of sufficient circumstantial allegations to charge recklessness)
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (standards for reversible jury‑charge error)
Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (trial judge’s duty to deliver correct written charge applicable to the case)