374 P.3d 1024
Utah Ct. App.2015Background
- Crane-Jenkins sued Mikarose LLC and its owners (Michaella and Brad Lawson) for unpaid overtime; all were served Nov 12, 2013.
- Brad Lawson (pro se) answered late and sought to set aside the December 9, 2013 default judgment on behalf of all three defendants; the court later held a pro se filing could represent only Brad.
- Michaella filed a pro se answer Jan 13, 2014; counsel entered and withdrew; a second attorney appeared and was instructed to file a separate Rule 60(b) motion for Michaella and Mikarose within 10 days, which was not done.
- Forty days after the March hearing the second attorney filed a Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) motion; the court denied it as untimely under the 90-day limit for subsections (1)–(3).
- New counsel then filed a second Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) motion 197 days after the default judgment; the district court denied relief as untimely and barred by law of the case.
- Defendants appealed; the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the 197‑day delay unreasonable under Rule 60(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crane-Jenkins) | Defendant's Argument (Michaella/Mikarose) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Rule 60(b)(4)/(6) motion filed 197 days after judgment was made within a "reasonable time" | The district court correctly treated the delay as unreasonable and denied relief | The 197‑day delay was reasonable under the circumstances; earlier counsel’s gross negligence excuses the delay | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; 197 days was unreasonable here |
| Whether grossly negligent attorney conduct warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) | Relief under (6) is limited; Menzies is narrow | Counsel’s gross negligence excused untimely filing and justifies relief | Denied: Menzies limited to its facts (usually capital or extreme abandonment); no comparable gross negligence here |
| Whether prior rulings barred the second motion (law of the case) | Law of the case barred relitigation | Second motion was precluded by prior rulings and procedural history | Court declined to reach or relied on untimeliness; law-of-the-case not needed to affirm |
| Whether motions under subsections (1)–(3) time limits apply | Subsections (1)–(3) require filing within 90 days | Defendants argued different subsections (4) and (6) applied so 90‑day limit is inapplicable | Court noted prior (1)‑(3) deadline but denied (4)/(6) motion as untimely under "reasonable time" standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994) (elements for relief under Rule 60(b))
- Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("reasonable time" requires diligence and absence of prejudice)
- Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) (factors for reasonable‑time inquiry)
- Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 68 P.3d 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (121‑day delay found reasonable where no notice was given)
- Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006) (recognized rare rule 60(b)(6) relief for counsel’s gross negligence; later limited)
- Harrison v. Thurston, 258 P.3d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (applied Menzies narrowly in noncapital context)
- Weber v. Mikarose, LLC, 351 P.3d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (Rule 60(b) standards reiterated)