Craig Steffen v. Patrick R. Donahoe
680 F.3d 738
| 7th Cir. | 2012Background
- Steffen, a USPS part-time mail handler, was employed from 1987 to 2006 but did not work for the last three years due to a back injury.
- USPS allowed return only if Steffen had no work restrictions; if restricted, he could apply for disability retirement.
- In 1998 Steffen injured his back; he later reinjured in 2003 and largely stopped working, with one week of work in July 2003.
- Settlement Agreement (October 2005) required Steffen to seek medical clearance for “full duty,” contact the Postal Medical Unit, and apply for disability retirement if not returnable to full duty; failure to comply could require resignation.
- Physicians eventually imposed permanent restrictions (lifting limits, limited standing, restricted bending and twisting), which USPS interpreted as “not full duty.”
- Steffen was terminated January 10, 2006 for violating the Settlement Agreement; he claimed disability discrimination under the Rehab Act and ADA, arguing USPS “regarded him as” disabled.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Steffen was regarded as disabled under the Rehab Act/ADA. | Steffen contends USPS regarded him as disabled. | USPS did not regard him as disabled under pre-Amendment standards. | No; insufficient evidence USPS regarded him as substantially limited. |
| Whether the 2009 ADA Amendments apply to his case. | Amendments should apply to determine being regarded as disabled. | Amendments not retroactive for this case. | Amendments do not apply retroactively; old ADA standard governs. |
| Whether the Settlement Agreement’s “100% healed” provision violates the ADA/Rehab Act per se. | Policy prevents individualized assessment and is per se unlawful. | Plaintiff had no standing as not disabled under ADA/Rehab Act. | Plaintiff lacks standing; no per se violation shown. |
| Whether Hughes’ deposition line proves USPS regarded Steffen as disabled. | Hughes’ statement shows belief of disability accommodations. | Statement is insufficient to prove substantial limitation or “regarded as” disabled. | Insufficient to prove “regarded as” disabled. |
| Whether Steffen had standing to claim per se violation independent of being disabled. | Should permit appeal on per se grounds. | Standing requires disability status under ADA/Rehab Act. | Standing lacking; per se claim rejected. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1999) (defines being regarded as disabled under pre-Amendments)
- Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (discusses the separate ‘qualified individual’ inquiry under ADA)
- Powers v. USF Holland, Inc., 667 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2011) (discusses 100% healed policy implications)
- Hendrickss-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1998) (addresses 100% healed policy standing)
- Jones v. UPS, Inc., 502 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2007) (illustrates 100% healed policy as circumstantial evidence)
- Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2001) (per se rule on 100% healed policy (cited))