Craig Cunningham v. General Dynamics Information
888 F.3d 640
| 4th Cir. | 2018Background
- Plaintiff Cunningham alleged GDIT (successor to Vangent) placed an autodialed, prerecorded call to his cell phone about HealthCare.gov enrollment on Dec. 2, 2015, in violation of the TCPA.
- CMS contracted with GDIT to perform HealthCare.gov contact-center outreach under the ACA; CMS provided call lists, scripts, and authorized use of an autodialer.
- CMS delivered a list including Cunningham’s number and instructed GDIT to call and leave the provided prerecorded message; GDIT did so.
- GDIT moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), claiming derivative sovereign (Yearsley) immunity because it acted at the government’s direction and the government validly authorized the conduct.
- The district court granted dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; Cunningham appealed arguing Yearsley (1) does not apply to federal claims, (2) does not apply here because CMS didn’t authorize or validly confer authority, and (3) is a merits (not jurisdictional) defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Yearsley apply to federal-law claims? | Yearsley applies only to state-law displacement contexts, not federal claims. | Yearsley applies broadly to derivative sovereign immunity, including federal claims. | Yearsley applies to federal claims. |
| Did the government authorize the contractor’s conduct? | GDIT violated contract duties (e.g., compliance obligations) by not obtaining TCPA consent, so CMS did not authorize the calls. | CMS provided lists, scripts, and explicit directions to call; GDIT followed instructions. | CMS authorized GDIT; GDIT acted as directed. |
| Did the government validly confer authority (i.e., within congressional power)? | CMS could not validly confer authority to engage in conduct that violates federal law (TCPA). | Valid conferral asks whether Congress empowered the agency to assign the task, not whether the resulting conduct might violate another law. | Authorization was validly conferred under Yearsley. |
| Is Yearsley a jurisdictional immunity or a merits defense? | Yearsley is not necessarily jurisdictional; may be a merits defense. | Yearsley is derivative sovereign immunity and thus deprives courts of jurisdiction when applicable. | Yearsley operates as a jurisdictional bar; dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (Sup. Ct.) (establishes derivative sovereign-immunity test: government authorization and valid conferral)
- Campbell‑Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (Sup. Ct.) (acknowledges Yearsley may immunize TCPA claims and clarifies contractor adherence to government instructions)
- In re KBR, Inc., 744 F.3d 326 (4th Cir.) (treats Yearsley as derivative sovereign immunity and discusses scope of conferral)
- Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir.) (recognizes need to protect government delegation through derivative immunity)
- Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir.) (discusses sovereign-immunity jurisprudence and jurisdictional dismissal procedure)
- Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (Sup. Ct.) (distinguishes suits against individuals from suits against government instrumentalities when assessing sovereign immunity)