Cpr for Skid Row v. City of Los Angeles
779 F.3d 1098
9th Cir.2015Background
- CPR for Skid Row (and two CPR members) challenged California Penal Code §403 as unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to their Walk protest activities.
- Walks through Skid Row were organized by the Central City East Association (CCEA) and attended by public officials, law enforcement, judiciary members, academics, and media.
- CPR protesters, including Pete White, staged protests near Walk participants, using chants and drums, and were warned they could be arrested under §403.
- CPR alleged §403 is vague and could criminalize protected First Amendment activity; the district court granted summary judgment for the City as to facial validity and denied CPR’s as-applied challenges.
- The court analyzed §403 in light of its exceptions for religious (Penal Code §302) and political/electoral meetings (Elections Code §18340) and explored California legislative history linking §403 to these exceptions.
- The outcome: §403 is not unconstitutional on its face, but §403 does not properly apply to CPR’s activities, so the case is remanded for further proceedings on relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is §403 void for vagueness on its face? | CPR argues §403 is vague because it obscures what conduct triggers penalties and how §18340 exclusions operate. | City argues §403 has a narrowed construction and the statutory scheme, including §18340, provides sufficient notice. | Not void on its face; §403 is constitutional facially. |
| Does §403 apply to CPR’s Walk protests as applied? | CPR contends §403 improperly applies to their political speech and conduct. | City contends §403 can apply to the protest conduct. | §403 does not properly apply to CPR’s activities; reverse and remand for relief. |
| Is §403 unconstitutional as a content-based or narrowly tailored restriction on speech? | §403 penalizes expressive conduct based on context; not narrowly tailored. | Statute targets disruption of meetings with context-specific exceptions; content-neutral as applied. | §403 is not unconstitutional on its face for content-based reasons. |
| How do §403 and §18340 interact regarding political meetings? | There is confusion about which statute governs political meetings and what conduct is prohibited. | §18340 governs political meetings; §403 excludes such meetings from its reach. | §403 does not cover meetings encompassed by §18340; the §403 application to CPR’s activity was improper. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930 (Cal. 1970) (First Amendment implications; narrowed §403 to avoid suppressing protest speech)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (vagueness standard for criminal statutes in free-expression context)
- NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (U.S. 1963) (strict scrutiny of vague/overbroad laws in free-expression context)
- United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1996) (strictly vague standards; First Amendment considerations)
- Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc; applying §403 to political meetings; discusses interactions with §18340)
- McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 104 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (California appellate treatment of §403 with political meetings (Kay lineage))