Cox v. United States, 3:16-cv-01428

Background

Petitioner Gaylon Richard Cox pleaded guilty in 1998 to one count of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) stemming from April 10, 1998; a second armed-robbery count was later dismissed. He signed a plea agreement that included a collateral-attack waiver.
At sentencing Judge Gonzalez found Cox to be a Career Offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on prior bank-robbery convictions, producing a Guidelines range that resulted in a 151-month sentence (after a three-level reduction).
In 2015 the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States invalidating the ACCA residual clause; Cox filed a pro se § 2255 motion in 2016 arguing Johnson undermines his Career Offender designation.
The government opposed, arguing waiver, procedural default, and that Johnson does not invalidate the Guidelines; it moved to stay pending Beckles.
The court found Cox could overcome procedural default (Johnson was a novel claim) and reached the merits: after Beckles v. United States the Guidelines are advisory and not subject to vagueness challenges, and robbery is treated as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 and its Application Note.
The court denied Cox’s § 2255 motion, concluding Beckles forecloses Johnson-based vagueness challenges to the Career Offender Guidelines and that unarmed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under Ninth Circuit precedent.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Johnson v. United States invalidates the Career Offender Guidelines residual clause and warrants § 2255 relief	Johnson voided the residual clause; unarmed bank robbery no longer counts as a crime of violence so Cox should lose Career Offender status	Guidelines are advisory after Booker/Beckles and not subject to vagueness; collateral waiver and procedural default bar relief	Denied — Beckles forecloses vagueness attack on Guidelines; Cox remains a Career Offender
Whether Cox procedurally defaulted his Johnson claim	Cox: claim was not reasonably available before Johnson, so default is excused	Gov: Cox failed to raise the issue on direct appeal and thus defaulted	Court found cause and prejudice excused default (Johnson was novel) and reached merits
Whether unarmed bank robbery qualifies under the force/elements clause	Cox: § 2113(a) does not require violent physical force or the mens rea required by recent Supreme Court decisions	Gov: Ninth Circuit precedent (Selfa) treats unarmed bank robbery as ‘‘threatened use of physical force’’; Application Note lists robbery	Held Cox’s unarmed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 and Ninth Circuit precedent
Effect of plea collateral-attack waiver on § 2255 claim	Cox: waiver should not bar this substantive challenge based on new Supreme Court decisions	Gov: waiver bars collateral attack	Court did not rely on the waiver to deny relief; it reached merits after excusing procedural default

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held void for vagueness)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines advisory scheme not subject to void-for-vagueness challenge)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson announced a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (incorrect Guidelines range can show a reasonable probability of a different sentence)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (cause and prejudice standard to excuse procedural default)
Stinson v. United States, 505 U.S. 36 (1992) (Guidelines commentary authoritative unless inconsistent)
United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990) (unarmed bank robbery qualifies as threatened use of physical force)
United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994) (district court may dismiss § 2255 motion under Rule 4 when entitlement to relief plainly does not appear)