Cowen v. People
2018 CO 96
| Colo. | 2018Background
- Jared Cowen owned a semi-truck, had repairs totaling $37,485.65, and paid with two company checks ($9,327.65 and $13,158.00) that bounced.
- Cowen was charged with two counts of fraud by check—one for each check; the jury convicted him for the first check and acquitted him for the second.
- At sentencing the prosecution sought $22,485.65 restitution (the total of both checks); the trial court ordered full restitution after finding by a preponderance that Cowen knowingly issued both bad checks.
- A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding restitution depends on the defendant’s conduct (not solely on the conviction).
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether restitution may be imposed for pecuniary losses caused by conduct underlying an acquitted charge, even when the defendant was convicted of a separate charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cowen) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether restitution may be ordered for losses caused by conduct underlying an acquitted charge | Restitution is authorized only for losses caused by conduct of which the defendant was convicted; acquitted conduct cannot support restitution | Restitution may be ordered if the court finds by a preponderance that the defendant’s conduct (acquitted or not) proximately caused the victim’s loss | Held: Colorado statutes do not permit restitution for losses caused by acquitted conduct; conviction on a separate charge does not authorize restitution for acquitted conduct |
| Whether construing statutes to allow restitution for acquitted conduct conflicts with statutory interpretation principles | Statutory text, definitions, and structure limit restitution to an offender’s conduct (i.e., conduct proven by conviction) | The term "conduct" is broad and captures all conduct that caused loss, regardless of conviction | Held: Plain language and statutory context (use of “offender”) show legislature intended restitution tied to convictions; People’s reading contradicts canons and statutory scheme |
| Whether allowing restitution on acquitted conduct raises due process concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment | Applying Nelson, the presumption of innocence for an acquitted charge bars monetary exactions based on that charge | Because Cowen was convicted of another count, he lost presumption of innocence as to other charges and Nelson is inapplicable | Held: Presumption of innocence applies to each charged offense; imposing restitution for acquitted conduct would violate procedural due process under Nelson/Mathews framework |
| Effect of legislative refund statute (§ 18-1.3-703) on restitution analysis | § 703 shows legislature intended refunds when convictions are overturned/acquittals occur; supporting limitation on restitution for acquitted conduct | § 703 is remedial and does not allow broader restoration of restitution power | Held: § 703 reinforces that restitution is tied to convictions; allowing restitution for acquitted conduct would create an irrational conflict with refund provisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005 (Colo. 2006) (restitution is a crucial element of sentencing)
- Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009) (interpreting expanded "victim" definition in restitution context; factual limits emphasized)
- Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (due process requires refund of conviction-based exactions when conviction is overturned or retrial results in acquittal)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (procedural due process balancing test)
- Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (plain-meaning rule: give effect to statutory text)