944 F.3d 773
9th Cir.2019Background:
- The INA bars admission of any alien "likely at any time to become a public charge," and directs officers to consider age, health, family status, assets/resources/financial status, and education/skills.
- INS 1999 Field Guidance treated "public charge" as primarily dependent on government subsistence and counted only cash assistance (e.g., SSI, TANF) or long-term institutionalization; non-cash benefits were excluded.
- DHS promulgated a 2019 Final Rule redefining "public charge" to include receipt of specified non-cash benefits (SNAP, certain housing assistance, Medicaid with exceptions, etc.) and to treat receipt exceeding 12 months in any 36-month period as significant.
- Multiple States, counties, and organizations sued in two district courts (N.D. Cal. and E.D. Wash.); both courts issued preliminary injunctions (California-limited and Washington nationwide) blocking the Final Rule.
- DHS moved for emergency stays pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit; the Ninth Circuit granted stays, concluding DHS showed a strong likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and that equities/public interest favored a stay.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing | States will suffer imminent financial and operational injury from disenrollment and lost federal reimbursements, giving Article III standing. | Injuries are speculative and rest on attenuated third-party choices; no certainly impending harm. | States sufficiently alleged imminent, traceable injuries; standing exists at the preliminary stage. |
| Statutory validity of Final Rule ("public charge") | Final Rule unlawfully expands "public charge" beyond INA/1999 Guidance; Congress implicitly rejected such expansion. | INA is ambiguous; DHS has regulatory authority and permissibly construed "public charge" to include certain in-kind benefits and a temporal test. | Chevron step 1: term ambiguous; step 2: DHS’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the INA and likely lawful. |
| APA arbitrary-and-capricious challenge (costs, disenrollment, public health) | DHS failed to adequately consider state/local costs, disenrollment effects, and public-health consequences (e.g., vaccinations). | DHS conducted extensive analysis, considered comments, and refined exemptions (children, pregnancy); changes were reasoned policy judgments. | DHS gave adequate explanations and responses; the Final Rule likely is not arbitrary and capricious. |
| Stay factors (irreparable harm; equities; public interest) | States will suffer irreparable fiscal and public-health harms if the rule takes effect. | DHS will irreparably lose the ability to enforce its statutory interpretation and may be unable to undo adjustment-of-status grants; public interest favors enforcement. | DHS demonstrated irreparable harm and a strong likelihood on the merits; balance of equities and public interest favor a stay. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (factors for stay pending appeal; likelihood of success and irreparable harm are critical)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two-step test for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (deference to permissible agency interpretations even if court would adopt different reading)
- Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (APA arbitrary-and-capricious review requires reasoned explanation)
- Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (predictable third-party effects can establish injury for standing)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (injury must be certainly impending; contrasted in standing analysis)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (requirements for reasoned explanation when agency changes course)
- FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (agency need not prove new policy superior but must provide good reasons)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury)
