7 Cal. App. 5th 12
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 1998 the Commission on State Mandates found eight duties imposed by the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) were state-mandated and reimbursable (counsel, experts, transportation, housing, etc.).
- Proposition 83 (Jessica’s Law), approved by voters in 2006, amended several SVPA provisions (e.g., indeterminate commitments, DMH authorization to petition for release) and reenacted certain code sections.
- In 2013 the Department of Finance requested the Commission to redetermine the 1998 decision under Gov. Code §17570, arguing Proposition 83 converted some statutory duties into voter-imposed (nonreimbursable) duties.
- The Commission found DOF made an adequate showing and in December 2013 concluded six of the previously reimbursable duties were now covered by the ballot measure and no longer reimbursable; two duties remained reimbursable.
- Counties filed administrative mandamus in state court challenging the redetermination; the trial court upheld the Commission. The Court of Appeal reversed, directing a writ to set aside the Commission’s redeterminations and to reconsider consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Proposition 83 was a "subsequent change in law" that converted previously found state-mandated duties into voter-imposed duties (so they are excluded from reimbursement under Gov. Code §17556(f) and §17570). | Counties: Prop 83 did not change the actual duties the SVPA imposed; reenactment alone does not change the source of a mandate, so duties remain state-mandated and reimbursable. | State/Commission: Voter approval modified the source of the law; because Prop 83 amended reenacted SVPA provisions, those duties are now voter-imposed and excluded from subvention. | Court held Prop 83 did not change the duties; reenactment without altering duties does not convert state-mandated duties into voter-imposed duties—the Commission erred. |
| Whether §17570’s definition of "subsequent change in law" is consistent with Article XIII B, §6 and may be applied to ballot initiative reenactments. | Counties: §17570/§17556(f) are being construed too broadly to let the state avoid constitutional reimbursement obligations. | State: Statutory scheme permits redetermination when voter-enacted changes amend the underlying statutes; definition is lawful. | Court adopted a narrow construction: §17570/§17556(f) only apply where the initiative changes the duties or source in substance, preserving Article XIII B’s purpose. |
| Whether the Commission’s exercise of §17570 authority (and the trial court’s deference) violated separation of powers or statutory limits. | Counties: Legislature cannot direct specific reconsideration; redetermination limited to actual changes in duties. | State: §17570 provides a constitutional procedure for redetermination and the Commission followed it. | Court concluded Commission exceeded proper reach because Prop 83 did not modify the duties; no separation-of-powers invalidation of §17570 when properly applied. |
| Whether the trial court correctly found the change in "funding dynamic" (voter approval preventing defunding) made the initiative a subsequent change in law altering source of mandate. | Counties: Funding mechanics (e.g., inability to line-item veto voter law) do not alter the legal source of duties imposed by the Legislature. | State/Trial Ct: Voter-enacted mandates cannot be suspended by line-item veto, so source and funding obligations changed. | Court rejected the funding-dynamics rationale: whether a program can be suspended under Art. XIII B §6(b) is downstream of the Commission’s mandate determination and does not change the source of duties. |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Fresno v. State of California, 53 Cal.3d 482 (explaining Article XIII A/B background and purpose)
- County of Los Angeles v. State of California, 43 Cal.3d 46 (discussing purpose of Article XIII B §6 and protection of local revenues)
- Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, 1 Cal.5th 749 (addresses mandate determinations and funding dynamics)
- California School Bds. Assn. v. State of California, 192 Cal.App.4th 770 (procedural and separation-of-powers limits on legislative referrals to Commission)
- San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates, 33 Cal.4th 859 (distinguishing source-of-mandate questions; federal vs. state source analysis)
- Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 978 (discussed reenactment context; court clarifies limits of reenactment reasoning)