138 A.3d 701
Pa. Commw. Ct.2016Background
- Allegheny County and the Allegheny Court Association of Professional Employees (the Association) were governed by a CBA effective 1/1/2011–12/31/2013 containing a “me too” clause and a Section 3(H) cost-containment provision limiting employee premium contributions to 2% of base salary.
- During successor-contract bargaining, the County informed the Association (letter dated 4/8/2014) it intended to implement a new health plan and increase payroll deductions to 2.25% (2014–15) and 2.5% (2016) under the CBA’s me-too authority; those increases were not explicitly authorized by the CBA’s 2% language.
- Arbitrator Amis issued an award (5/6/2014) modifying the me-too threshold to 50% and explicitly continuing the 2% employee contribution “for the life of this Agreement.” The County nevertheless implemented higher deductions on 6/20/2014.
- The Association and County exchanged emails through Sept. 2014 attempting to resolve the discrepancy; the County refused to revert deductions or to seek clarification from Arbitrator Amis and told the Association to file a new grievance.
- The Association filed a grievance on 10/6/2014. Arbitrator Kobell held the grievance timely (finding the seven-work-day filing period did not start until 9/25/2014) and on the merits ordered reimbursement of excess deductions and continuation of the 2% contribution through the CBA term.
- The County sought to vacate Arbitrator Kobell’s award in trial court arguing the award ignored the CBA’s seven-work-day filing deadline; the trial court upheld the arbitration award and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (County) | Defendant's Argument (Association) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an arbitrator’s procedural determination (timeliness) is subject to judicial review | Kobell’s finding that the grievance was timely ignores the CBA’s explicit seven-work-day deadline and thus the award fails the essence test | Procedural issues belong to the arbitrator and are final; courts should not revisit arbitrator’s procedural rulings | The court held procedural determinations are subject to review under the essence test (not insulated from review) but generally reserved to arbitrators absent a CBA limitation |
| Whether Arbitrator Kobell’s timeliness ruling drew its essence from the CBA | The grievance was filed well beyond seven work days after notice (April or June 2014) so the award failed the essence test | The filing period did not begin until 9/25/2014 because prior communications and ongoing arbitration/negotiations tolled or prevented reasonable discovery of a violation | The court upheld Kobell: his factual conclusion that the discovery/filing period began on 9/25/2014 was an arguably reasonable construction of the CBA and satisfied the essence test |
| Whether the award’s substantive relief (continuing 2% contribution) was consistent with the CBA and prior award | The County argued the me-too clause allowed changing contributions and the arbitrator improperly disregarded it | The Association relied on Arbitrator Amis’s award that explicitly continued the 2% contribution for the life of the Agreement | The court affirmed Kobell’s substantive ruling as an arguable interpretation of the CBA and Amis’s award, so it drew its essence from the agreement |
| Whether ongoing bargaining/communications tolled contractual filing deadlines | County contended the clock ran from its 4/8/2014 notice or from the June payroll deductions | Association argued the parties’ negotiations and the pending arbitration meant the Association reasonably could not know a violation existed until 9/25/2014 | The court accepted the arbitrator’s factual finding that negotiations and ambiguity delayed discovery and thus tolled the seven-day deadline, which met the essence test |
Key Cases Cited
- John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (U.S. 1964) (procedural prerequisites to arbitration are intertwined with merits and typically for arbitrators to decide)
- Radio Corp. of America v. Ass’n of Prof’l Eng’g Personnel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961) (federal precedent on arbitrator authority over procedural issues)
- Kardon v. Portare, 353 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1976) (parties may limit arbitrator jurisdiction by CBA language)
- School Dist. of City of Duquesne v. Duquesne Educ. Ass’n, 380 A.2d 353 (Pa. 1977) (arbitrator may decide procedural issues when CBA does not limit jurisdiction)
- State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 612 A.2d 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (arbitrator’s allowance of extremely late grievance failed essence test where CBA explicitly imposed a filing limit)
- Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dale, 424 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1981) (courts defer to arbitrator’s interpretation when dispute is within the agreement’s terms)
- Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Teachers, 122 A.3d 469 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (describing the essence test standard of review)
- Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005) (discussing discovery-rule tolling principles)