Lead Opinion
OPINION BY
The Neshaminy School District (District) appeals from the June 30, 2014 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) denying the District’s
Facts/Procedural History
The following facts are not in dispute. The District and the Federation are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired in 2008. After four years of working without a contract, the Federation went on strike in January 2012 (first strike), during the 2011-12 academic year. Following the first strike, the parties proceeded to non-binding arbitration, after which the Federation commenced another strike on June 4, 2012 (second strike). The Secretary of Education sought an injunction in the trial court under the Public School Code of 1949 (Code),
Following a hearing, on June 11, 2012, the trial court issued an injunction enjoining the Federation’s members from continuing their strike beyond June 14-15, 2012. While still in the courtroom after the injunction was issued, between 11:00 а.m. and 12:15 p.m., the Federation advised the District that it was no longer on strike and that its membership was prepared to return to school the following day. In response, the District advised that there was insufficient time to open school on June 12, 2012, but that it would reopen on June 13, 2012.
Arbitration
Following its members’ return to work on June 13, 2012, the Federation filed a grievance, alleging that the District failed to provide its members one day’s pay at their individual, per diem rates when it refused to allow the members to return to work on June 12, 2012, thereby creating a de facto lockout. The grievance proceeded to arbitration, and a hearing was held before Thomas G. McConnell, Jr. (the Arbitrator), at which Louis Muenker, the District’s then-Superintendent, testified regarding the infeasibility of reopening the District’s schools on June 12, 2012, due to the short notice provided.
On cross-examination, Dr. Muenker stated that aside from the fact that in-service days are typically geared toward providing continuing-education credits, there were no requirements setting minimum standards for the agenda of an in-service day. Additionally, he acknowledged receipt of President Boyd’s June 11 emails. (R.R. at 120a-21a.)
In support of the Federation’s grievance, President Boyd, who also serves as a biology teacher for the District, stated that after she advised Dr. Muenker that the staff was prepared to return to work on June 12th, he advised that the District would reopen on the 13th. In follow up, President Boyd suggested an in-service day, but was informed by a District representative that “the staff would return when the students were scheduled to return, on the 13th.” (R.R. at 121a.)
Following the hearing, the Arbitrator issued an order (Award) sustaining the grievance and directing the District to make the Federation’s members whole for any lost wages they incurred with regard to June 12, 2012. The Arbitrator reasoned that the District effectuated a constructive lockout on June 12th by disallowing its staff to return to work. While recognizing that Section 1101-A of the Code
Further, the Arbitrator concluded that the District breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it precluded the Federation’s members from working on June 12, 2012, and thereby precluded them from being paid for working the contractual “normal work year” under Article X, Section 10-26 of the
Trial Court
The District subsequently filed a petition to vacate the Award with the trial court, contending that it does not draw its essence from the CBA and violates public policy insofar as the Arbitrator found that: (1) Dr. Muenker was required to confer with his cabinet prior to deciding that the staff would not work on June 12, 2012; (2) a constructive lockout occurred on June 12, 2012; (3) the District violated the covenant of gоod faith and fair dealing; and (4) the District was obligated to schedule a work day on June 12, 2012, and pay its staff for the day.
Applying the essence test,
Regarding the second prong of the essence test, the trial court determined that the Award could be construed as being rationally derived from the CBA. The trial court explained that the Arbitrator’s interpretation of Section 1101-A was based upon the plain language of the CBA and was not contrary to law. The trial court concluded that the Arbitrator’s finding that the District violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was based on the District’s violation of Article X, Section 10-26 setting the work year. Finally, the trial court clarified that the Arbitrator did not conclude the District was required to schedule a work day on June 12, 2012, but only to use due dili
Issues
On appeal to this Court, the District argues that the Arbitrator’s Award, insofar as the Arbitrator concluded that a constructive lockout occurred on June 12, 2012, and that the District violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violates public policy and/or fails to draw its essence from the CBA. We agree.
Discussion
Essence Test
As noted above, grievance awards under the Public Employe Relations Act
Section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA provides, in pertinent part, that a court reviewing an arbitration award shall “modify or correct the award where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered a. different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Judgment n.o.v. “may be entered where (1) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or (2) the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that judgment was due to the moving party.” White v. City of Philadelphia,
Constructive Lockout
The District first argues that the Arbitrator’s Award, insofar as the Arbitrator сoncluded that the District engaged in a constructive lockout on June 12, 2012, when the District declined to schedule work on that day, violates public policy. Under the public policy exception to the essence test, a court should not enforce a grievance arbitration award when it contravenes a “well-defined, dominant” public policy, as “ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7,
As the trial court noted, the issue concerning wages and compensation due for June 12, 2012, fell within the terms of the CBA, specifically Article X, Sections 10-25 and 10-26 dealing with the normal work day and normal work year. However, in reaching his determination that the District engaged in a constructive lockout, the Arbitrator went beyond the terms of the CBA and reliеd on his interpretation of section 1101-A of the Code,
A “[sjtrike” is defined, in pertinent part, as a:
[Concerted action in failing to report for duty, the willful absence from one’s position, the stoppage of work, slowdown or the abstinence, in whole or in part, from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment ... A written notice of the intent to strike shall be delivered by the employe organization to the superintendent, executive director or the director no later than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the commencement of any strike, and no strike may occur sooner than forty-eight (48) hours following the last notification of intent to strike. Upon receipt of the notification of intent to strike, the superintendent, executive director or the director may cancel school for the effective date of the strike. A decision to cancel school may, however, be withdrawn by the superintendent, executive director or the director. Any subsequent change of intents to strike shall not affect the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike. For the purposes of this article, the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike shall not be considered a lockout.
24 P.S. § 11-1101-A (emphasis added). The Arbitrator interpreted this “strike” language as only applying to the commencement, not the end of, a strike.
However, this interpretation ignores the express language of section 1101-A relating to a “[s]trike” and, hence, is contrary to publiс policy. Moreover, although a strike may not occur sooner than 48 hours following notification of intent to strike, thus providing school districts with at least 48 hours’ notice to prepare for a strike, the Federation essentially argues that the District must revoke a cancellation of the school day in less than 24 hours.
The District received notice that the Federation intended to strike on June 4, 2012, and, in accordance with section 1101-A, the Superintendent cancelled school. A strike is not a single-day event but continues for so long as the teachers choose not to report for work. Such a characterization is consistent with the General Assembly’s use of the plural “intents to strike” instead of “intent” and its reference to “A decision” rather than “The decision” to cancel school in section 1101-A.
The District believed that the Federation would continue with its strike until at least June 14, the last day that the parties stipulated in the injunction proceedings that the Federation could strike in relation to kindergarten students and still meet the required 180 days of education. The District only learned of the Federation’s intent to cancel the strike and return to work on June 12 around noon the preceding day. For reasons explained above, the Superintendent exercised his discretion pursuant to section 1101-A (“A decision to cancel school may, however, be withdrawn by the superintendent_”) in not withdrawing the cancelled school day of June 12, a date of the intended strike, having been given less than a day’s notice of the cancellation of the strike. The Superintendent exercised his discretion pursuant to statutory authority to evaluate whether the District would be ready to reopen on such short notice. Moreover, the Superintendent’s actions were consistent with section 1101-A, which states- that “[a]ny subsequent change of intents to strike shall not affect the decision to cancel school on the day of the-intended strike.”
The Federation further asserts, and the Arbitrator found, that the Superintendent’s exercise of discretion was in effect a
There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the District’s actions in this case meet the definition of a “[ljockout.” To the contrary, the record indicates that the Superintendent exercised his discretion based on the lack of adequate time to prepare, which in turn was based on his evaluation of a number of noted reasons, including issues relating to transportation, food services, and regulation of air-conditioning.
The record is also completely devoid of any evidence that not withdrawing the decision to cancel school on June 12 was “for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment.” 24 P.S. § 11-1101-A. In other words, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Superintendent’s objective, goal, or end in not withdrawing the cancelled school day on June 12 was to induce, influence, or coerce a change in the conditions, compensation, or the rights, privileges, or obligations of employment. Rather, the decision to cancel school on June 12 was premised on the Federation’s indicated intent to continue its strike on that day.
Because the Arbitrator ignored and/or misinterpreted the express language of section 1101-A of the Code, the Award, insofar as it concludes that the District engaged in a constructive lockout on June 12, 2012, is contrary to public рolicy.
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Next, the District argues that the Award does not draw its essence from the CBA insofar as it concludes that the District violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Arbitrator relied on the Superintendent’s failure to engage in consultation with his cabinet members or other administrators regarding the opening of the school on June 12 to hold that the District had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court likewise relied on such failure in denying the District’s petition to vacate the Arbitrator’s Award.
By essentially reading a new provision into the CBA, ie., requiring the Superintendent to meet with his cabinet, the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction and authority, which is limited to interpreting the terms of the CBA. Indeed, without citing any specific provision of the CBA, the Arbitrator stated that the Superintendent “could at the very least have convened a meeting of his Cabinet to discuss the matter, and to ‘brainstorm’ on the issue, and possibly include administrators who had experience with in-service days ... Certainly further collaboration might have yielded some creative ways of using the time on June 12, 2012.” (R.R. at 129a) (emphasis added).
This Court recently addressed a similar situation in City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1,
On appeal, the common pleas court vacated the award and dismissed the grievances. The common pleas court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because the award was not rationally related to the terms and conditions of the CBA and infringed on the City’s managerial prerogative to negotiate the compensation for on-duty officers. The common pleas court noted that the arbitrator disregarded the CBA’s compensation terms and “instead made a judgment as to what the CBA should say as opposed to what it actually says.” Id. at 798 (emphasis in original). The common pleas court also noted that the arbitrator could not point to any language in the CBA to support his analysis. This Court affirmed the common pleas court’s оrder, stressing that the arbitrator lacked the authority to read new terms into the CBA and direct the City to “do something that had not been bargained with the Union....” Id. at 802.
Conclusion
Having concluded that the Arbitrator’s Award violates public policy and fails to draw its essence from the CBA, the trial court’s order is reversed and the Award of the Arbitrator is vacated.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of July, 2015, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, dated June 30, 2014, is hereby reversed. The Arbitrator’s Award, sustaining a grievance filed by the Nesh-aminy Federation of Teachers, is vacated.
Notes
. This opinion was reassigned to the author on March 24, 2015.
. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101-27-2702.
. Kindergarten students needed to return to school by June 15 th and the remainder of the student population needed to return by June 16th.
. Section 1161-A of the Code provides:
When an employe organization is on strike for an extended period that would not permit the school entity to provide the period of instruction required by section 1501 by June 30, the Secretary of Education may initiate, in the appropriate county court of common pleas, appropriate injunctive proceedings providing for the required period of instruction. 24 P.S. § 11 — 1161—A, added by the Act of July 9, 1992, P.L. 403. Section 1501 of the Code further specifies that kindergarten, elementary, and secondary pupils must be provided 180 days of instruction each school year. 24 P.S. § 15-1501.
.The District has 8,500 students, 650 faculty, 1,250 total employees, and 12 buildings consisting of 8 elementary schools, 3 middle schools, and 1 high school.
. Because hearing transcripts have not been included in the reproduced record, we rely upon the Arbitrator’s characterization of the testimony, which neither party disputes.
. Section 1101-A of the Code provides:
"Strike” shall mean concerted action in failing to report for duty, the wilful absence from one’s position, the stoppage of work, slowdown or the abstinence, in whole or in part, from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment. The employe organization having called a strike once and unilaterally returned to work may only call a lawful strike once more during the school year. A written notice of the intent to strike shall be delivered by the employe organization to the superintendent, executive director or the director no later than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the commencement of any strike, and no strike may occur sooner than forty-eight (48) hours following the last notification of intent to strike. Upon receipt of the notification of intent to strike, the superintendent, executive director or the director may cancel school for the effective date of the strike. A decision to cancel school may, however, he withdrawn hy the superintendent, executive director or the director. Any subsequent change of intents to strike shall not affect the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike. For the purposes of this article, the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike shall not be considered a lockout.
24 P.S. § 11-1101-A (emphasis added), added by Act of July 9, 1992, P.L. 403.
. Article X provides, in relevant part:
10-2S NORMAL WORK DAY
10-25.1 The normal work day for classroom teachers is seven (7) hours except on those days when their professional services are needed at conferences and meetings. This may be a flexible seven (7) hour schedule.
[[Image here]]
10-26 NORMAL WORK YEAR
10-26.1 The Salary Schedule identified as "Appendix A” attached to this Agreement are based on 188.5 days of service.
10-26.2 As used herein, the term "National Work Year” shall mean 188.5 days of service....
(R.R. at 45a-46a.)
. Under the essence test, courts engage in a two-pronged approach to reviewing arbitration awards:
First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only vacate an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.
State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA),
. Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301.
. Added by the Act of July 9, 1992, P.L. 403, 24P.S. § 11 — 1101—A.
. Contrary to the dissent, the Majority does not impose upon the Federation a duty to provide 48 hours' notice to the District of its intent to cancel a strike. Rather, the Majority simply cites the 48 hour requirement in section 1101-A of the Code, uрon which the Arbitrator relied, to emphasize the unreasonableness of requiring the District to notify its 8,500 students, 650 faculty, and 1,250 total employees, and prepare its 12 school buildings for reopening in less than 24 hours. Such determination does not, as the dissent alleges, merely advance the general considerations of supposed public interests. In addition, the dissent ignores the discretion afforded to the Superintendent under this section to withdraw a decision to cancel school, as well as this section’s definition of the term "[Ijock-out.”
. The CBA sets forth the on-duty compensation rate for basic compensation, longevity pay, shift differential pay, overtime pay, and holiday pay. The CBA also sets forth the off-duty compensation rate for secondary employment, $41.12 per hour (equivalent to the overtime rate for a fourth year poliсe officer), and is paid directly by the secondary employer.
. Contrary to the dissent, the Majority does not misconstrue the Award or the trial court's decision insofar as it states that neither the Arbitrator nor the trial court could point to any provision of the parties’ CBA requiring the Superintendent to consult with others before making decisions. Indeed, the Majority does not dispute, as the dissent notes, that a duty of good faith and fair dealing impliedly exists in every contract. However, in this case, both the Arbitrator and the trial court specifically relied on the Superintendent's failure to consult others regarding the opening of school on June 12, 2012, in concluding that the Superintended breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As the Majority notes, the Arbitrator essentially read a new provision into the CBA, which exceeded his jurisdiction and authоrity, and resulted in his Award not drawing its essence from the CBA.
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
The majority reverses the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County’s (trial court) order affirming the Arbitrator’s decision that the Neshaminy School District (District) arbitrarily decided not to have a “work day” and thereby deprived teachers of being paid for a “normal work year.”
I.
The underlying facts are as follows. The Federation commenced a strike on June 4, 2012. One week later, on June 11, 2012, the trial court enjoined the Federation’s members from continuing their strike beyond June 14-15, 2012. While still in the courtroom after the injunction
After its members returned to work on June 13, 2012, the Federation filed a grievance, alleging that the District created a de facto lockout when it disallowed members to return to work on June 12, 2012, and seeking recovery of its members’ pay for this day.
Before the Arbitrator, Superintendent Muenker testified that it was not feasible to reopen the District’s sсhools on June 12, 2012, due to the short notice provided. He cited concerns with making timely arrangements for transportation, food services and air-conditioning, and stated that although the staff could have used the day for professional development, there was not enough time to develop meaningful plans.
On cross-examination, Superintendent Muenker admitted that he did not consult his cabinet members or other administrators in making this decision and that aside from the fact that in-service days are typically geared toward providing continuing-education credits, there were no requirements setting minimum standards for the agenda of an in-service day. He further conceded that he received two e-mails from the Federation’s Local President, Louise Boyd, proposing possible plans for the day but stated that those plans did not address nurses, librаrians or elementary staff.
Based on those facts, the Arbitrator found that the District effectuated a constructive lockout on June 12, 2012, by disallowing its staff to return to work. While recognizing that certain closures are not to be considered lockouts under Section 1101-A of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code),
On appeal, the trial court applied the essence test and affirmed the award, finding that the issue fell within Article X, Sections 10-25 and 10-26 of the CBA, and that the award could be construed as being rationally derived from the CBA because the Arbitrator’s interpretation of Section 1101-A of the Code was consistent with the provision’s plain language and law. With respect to the covenant of good faith, the trial court held that the District violated this duty regarding its implementation of Article X, Section 10-26, setting the work year, by failing to use due diligence in considering whether June 12, 2012, should be used for in-service.
The majority finds that the Arbitrator’s award does not derive from the essence of the CBA bеcause requiring the District' to provide a work day after only one day’s notice violates public policy and because nothing in the CBA requires the Superintendent to engage in consultation with others before making decisions about whether to open school. I disagree for the following reasons.
II.
A.
The majority finds a violation of public policy based upon Section 1101-A of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11-1101-A, providing that when a union gives 48 hours’ written notice of its intent to strike but decides not to strike, that the Superintendent’s decision to cancel school for the effective date of the strike shall not be considered a lockout. According to the majority, Section 1101-A of the Code must mean that a union is also required to give 48 hours’ notice of its intent to return from a strike because otherwise, it places the District at the mercy of the Federation’s decision to return to work without adequate notice. This leads the majority to conclude that the Arbitrator’s award finding a lockout must be against public policy.
I disagree with the majority because for an Arbitrator’s decision to be against public policy, it must be against a “well-defined, dominant” public policy, as “ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association,
B.
The Arbitrator’s conclusion that the District created a lockout derives its essence from the terms of the CBA and is not against public policy. The Arbitrator duly noted that Section 1101-A of the Code governs the notice the Federation was required to provide the District in order to commence its strike, not to end a strike.
However, a strike ends and turns into a lockout when employees are no longer engaged in a “stoppage of work” or “willful[l] absence from [their] positions,” but when a school district “withhold[s] work from employe[e]s,” despite their willingness to return, regardless of why the closure initially began. Section 1101-A of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11-1101-A.
The Arbitrator found that the District engaged in a constructive lockout and did
C.
The majority also finds that the award did not draw itself from the essence of the CBA because it found nothing in the contract requiring the Superintendent to consult with anyone to determine whether it would be feasible to schedule a teacher work day. In effect, the majority holds that it is within the Superintendent’s sole discretion whether to have a school day, even if everyone agrees that an in-service day could be scheduled.
In this case, the Arbitrator found that the District violated the covenant of good faith insofar as it, acting through its Superintendent, failed to engage in due diligence to decide whether to reopen its schools 'on June 12, 2012. In reviewing Section 10-26 in conjunction with the duty of good faith implicit in contracts, the Arbitrator determined that the District was prеcluded from refusing to reopen its schools after they had been closed due to a strike notwithstanding Section 1101-A of the Code, unless its decision was formed following the exercise of due diligence. In other words, he held that the District cannot convert what started as a strike into a lockout by failing, in bad faith, to reopen during a period in which school was originally cancelled.
The majority misconstrues the award and the trial court’s decision insofar as it holds that they “fail to cite any provision of the parties’ CBA requiring the Superintendent to engage in consultation with others before making decisions.” (Majority Opinion, at 476.) Indeed, “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” Agrecycle, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh,
Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the duty of good faith could have been breached only if there existed a provision in the CBA requiring the Superintendent to engage in consultation with others before making decisions. If such a provision did exist, there would be no violation of the duty because there would exist an independent cause of action for breach of an express contract provision. In assessing the duty of good faith, we
To that end, the Arbitrator and trial court did point to provisions of the CBA with regard to which they found that the District did not exercise good faith. Specifically, they held that the District failed to exercise due diligence in implementing the “normal work day” and “normal work year” under Article X, Sections 10-25 and 10-26 of the CBA. The Arbitrator and trial court did not conclude, as the majority asserts, that the District was required to consult with the School Board before rendering a decision, but rather indicated that such action would be an indicium of good faith. Certainly, the District was free to put forth other relevant evidence оf its due diligence, but it offered none, and, therefore, the tribunals below found that the District did not satisfy its implied duty. Contrary to the majority’s holding, I do not find that the decisions below “made a judgment as to what the CBA should say as opposed to what it actually says.” (Majority Opinion, at 477.) Rather, they merely imposed the well-established contractual principle of good faith, which by its very definition, is not a duty appearing in the express CBA terms.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, I would affirm the trial court’s decision.
. The District and the Neshaminy Federation of Teachers (Federation) are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired in 2008. Article X of the CBA provides:
10-25 NORMAL WORK DAY
10-25.1 The normal work day for classroom teachers is seven (7) hours except on those days when their professional services are needed at conferences and meetings. This may be a flexible seven (7) hour schеdule.
[[Image here]]
10-26 NORMAL WORK YEAR 10-26.1 The Salary Schedule identified as "Appendix A” attached to this Agreement are based on 188.5 days of service.
10-26.2 As used herein, the term "National Work Year” shall mean 188.5 days of service....
(Reproduced Record [R.R.] at 45a-46a.)
. Section 1101-A of the Code provides:
"Strike” shall mean concerted action in failing to report for duty, the wilful absence from one’s position, the stoppage of work, slowdown or the abstinence, in whole or in part, from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment. The employe .organization having called a strike once and unilaterally returned to work may only call a lawful strike once more during the school year. A written notice of the intent to strike shall be delivered by the employe organization to the superintendent, executive director or the director no later than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the commencement of any strike, and no strike may occur sooner than forty-eight (48) hours following the last notification of intent to strike. Upon receipt of the notification of intent to strike, the superintendent, executive director or the director may cancel school for the effective date of the strike. A decision to cancel school may, however, be withdrawn by the superintendent, executive director or the director. Any subsequent change of intents to strike shall not affect the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike. For the purposes of this article, the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike shall not be considered a lockout.
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, 24 P.S. § 11-1101-A (emphasis added), added by Act of July 9, 1992, P.L. 403.
. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) explicitly sets forth the scope of judicial' review of
. Section 1101-A is silent rеgarding what notice, if any, is necessary to end a strike.
. Regardless, there is no evidence of record indicating that the Federation ever notified the District of its intent to strike on June 12, 2012. The majority opinion references the District's belief "that the Federation would continue with its strike until at least June 14,” based upon the parties’ stipulation in the injunction proceedings that this was the last day the Federation was legally permitted to strike under Section 1161 — A of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11 — 1161—A, added by the Act of July 9, 1992, P.L. 403. (Majority Opinion, at 475.) However, this stipulation addresses only the Federation’s legal options and not its actual intent or the notice it provided. Therefore, because there is no evidence that the Federation notified the District of its intent to strike on June 12, 2012, the District's cancellation of school on this day is not insulated under Section 1101-A of the Code. See 24 P.S. §11-1101-A ("For the purposes of this article, the decision to cancel school on the day of the intended strike shall not be considered a lockout.” (emphasis added)).
.A contrary ruling would enable a school district to effectuate a lockout under the guise of a strike.