Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C., 321 Conn. 244

James T. Costello and Dorothy Costello (self-represented) sued Goldstein & Peck, P.C., Kupinse and McPherson for legal malpractice and commenced the action with a complaint and a summons.
The summons listed a recognizance name of “Dorothy A. Smulley” (Dorothy Costello’s maiden name); no third-party recognizance or certification of financial responsibility appeared.
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the summons was defective under General Statutes § 52-185(a) and Practice Book §§ 8-3/8-4 for lacking a third‑party recognizance or certification.
The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment of dismissal, concluding a plaintiff cannot sign his/her own recognizance and only a third party suffices; it did not order the plaintiffs to file a bond before dismissing.
The trial court’s postjudgment articulation stated it would have allowed the plaintiffs to cure by filing a bond or proper recognizance but said plaintiffs’ insistence on the recognizance’s validity precluded the court from ordering a bond; plaintiffs appealed.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding the court abused its discretion by not affording plaintiffs an opportunity to file a bond under § 52-185(d) / Practice Book § 8-5(b); the case was remanded for that purpose.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the summons was defective because the recognizance was not a third‑party signature	Costello: § 52-185’s third‑party requirement applies only to non‑inhabitants; the assistant clerk’s signature certified financial responsibility; spouses may recognize for each other	Defendants: The summons lacked a valid third‑party recognizance or certification so it was defective and jurisdictionally defective	Court: Unnecessary to resolve statutory construction because plaintiffs should have been given chance to file bond; reversed dismissal for failure to allow cure
Whether the trial court was required or had discretion to order bond/allow curing before dismissal	Costello: Trial court should have ordered bond or informed plaintiffs of cure option; plaintiffs would have filed bond	Defendants: Court has discretion; Practice Book vests discretion and may not compel bond; conflict with statute favors rule	Court: Even assuming discretion exists, the trial court abused it by failing to exercise it and by declining to order a bond or offer cure before dismissing

Franchi v. Farmholme, Inc., 191 Conn. 201 (Conn. 1983) (recognizance defects are amendable and may be cured)
Boyles v. Preston, 68 Conn. App. 596 (Conn. App. 2002) (policy favoring trial on merits and liberal interpretation of practice rules)
Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223 (Conn. 1995) (definition and limits of judicial discretion)
Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2001) (exercise of discretion should further substantial justice)
Palmer v. Des Reis, 136 Conn. 232 (Conn. 1949) (definition and purpose of recognizance)
State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60 (Conn. 1994) (error where trial court fails to exercise discretion)
State v. Martin, 201 Conn. 74 (Conn. 1986) (trial court must exercise discretion when called upon)
Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414 (Conn. 1984) (courts solicitous of self‑represented litigants’ rights)
New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489 (Conn. 2005) (same)
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Kluczinsky, 171 Conn. 516 (Conn. 1976) (same)
Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174 (Conn. 2000) (plenary review when court fails to exercise discretion)