Correll Thomas v. C. Dillard
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6210
9th Cir.2016Background
- Officer Christopher Dillard responded to dispatches about possible domestic violence and a separate report of a man in a purple shirt "pushing" a woman on Palomar College campus; he located Correll Thomas (matching the purple-shirt description) with his girlfriend, Amy Husky.
- On arrival Dillard observed no visible injury, no signs of a fight, and both subjects near an open, public area; Husky said they had been kissing (and later denied abuse); Thomas answered questions and refused consent to a weapons search.
- About 30–40 seconds into the encounter Dillard attempted to place Thomas in a controlled hold for a frisk; Thomas stepped back. Dillard drew his Taser, ordered compliance, and after repeated refusals tased Thomas in dart mode about six minutes into the encounter; no weapon was found.
- Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure (Terry frisk without reasonable suspicion) and excessive force (Taser). District court denied qualified immunity to Dillard and granted partial summary judgment to Thomas on liability.
- Ninth Circuit: held the domestic-violence nature of a call is relevant but not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a Terry frisk; concluded Dillard violated the Fourth Amendment (unlawful frisk and excessive force) but was entitled to qualified immunity on both claims because the law was not clearly established in 2010.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the perceived domestic-violence nature of the call alone gave reasonable suspicion to frisk Thomas | Thomas: domestic-violence label insufficient; officer needed specific, articulable facts indicating Thomas was armed and dangerous | Dillard: domestic-violence call (and matching description) justified a frisk because such calls frequently involve weapons | Held: Domestic-violence nature is relevant but not alone sufficient; here totality of circumstances did not yield reasonable suspicion |
| Whether detaining Thomas for a frisk violated the Fourth Amendment | Thomas: detention to perform a suspicionless frisk was unlawful seizure | Dillard: detention was a lawful Terry stop extended to a frisk based on perceived domestic-violence risk | Held: Detention for a frisk violated the Fourth Amendment (no reasonable suspicion) but qualified immunity applies because precedent did not clearly foreclose Dillard’s view in 2010 |
| Whether tasing Thomas to compel compliance constituted excessive force | Thomas: Taser use was objectively unreasonable because there was no need to neutralize an armed suspect | Dillard: Taser use was reasonable to effectuate what he reasonably believed was a lawful frisk | Held: Tasing was excessive force under Graham analysis, given lack of threat and mainly passive resistance |
| Whether officer is entitled to qualified immunity for the unlawful frisk and tasing | Thomas: right was clearly established that a frisk requires reasonable suspicion and force to effectuate a suspicionless frisk is unlawful | Dillard: law was unsettled as to whether domestic-violence suspicion alone justified a frisk and whether Taser use was unreasonable in this context | Held: Qualified immunity granted on both claims because the law was not sufficiently clearly established in 2010 for an officer in Dillard’s position |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (protective frisk requires reasonable suspicion that suspect is armed and dangerous)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (frisk requires particularized suspicion as to the person searched)
- Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (reasonable suspicion must be specific and individualized)
- Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012 (frisk unlawful without reasonable suspicion that person is armed and dangerous)
- United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160 (domestic-violence calls may be volatile; exigent circumstances assessed case-by-case)
- United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154 (certain crimes not frequently associated with weapons do not alone justify a frisk)
- Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (Taser in dart mode is an intermediate level of force)
- Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (protective search is a limited intrusion justified by reasonable suspicion)