Corpac v. Rubin & Rothman, LLC, 10 F. Supp. 3d 349

Background

Plaintiff John T. Corpac filed an FDCPA class action against Rubin & Rothman, LLC alleging the defendant sent collection letters falsely implying meaningful attorney review.
Co-defense counsel Robert L. Arleo had previously co‑counseled with Plaintiff’s lawyer William Horn in 23 similar FDCPA cases.
On January 28, 2013 the court ordered Arleo to withdraw, reasoning his past relationship with Horn could create conflicts if he remained involved in notice, settlement procedures, objection hearings, or trial.
Arleo moved for reconsideration solely to allow him to serve as co‑defense counsel if the parties negotiated a new court‑approved class notice plan; he did not seek to re‑argue the ban on involvement in negotiations, settlement procedures or trial.
The court denied reconsideration, finding Arleo failed to show controlling law or facts were overlooked or that the prior order was clearly erroneous or would cause manifest injustice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the January 28, 2013 disqualification order contained clear error or overlooked controlling precedent	Arleo argued the order contradicted itself and misapplied precedent; cited cases that allegedly required narrower disqualification	Court should permit Arleo to return as co‑counsel if a court‑approved notice plan is negotiated	Denied — no clear error; prior order stands
Whether the court neglected Second Circuit authority requiring careful analysis in novel ethical questions	Arleo claimed the court ignored Fund of Funds and similar commands for painstaking analysis	Court had expressly considered and applied Second Circuit precedent and analogous authority	Denied — court applied required analysis
Whether class‑action specific precedent (Agent Orange, Austrian & German Bank) precludes disqualification	Arleo argued class‑action settlement contexts counsel against mechanical application of ordinary disqualification rules	Court found those cases factually distinct and inapplicable here	Denied — class‑action precedents did not change result
Whether disqualification causes manifest injustice by denying defendant choice of counsel	Arleo contended withdrawal unjustly deprived defendant of counsel choice	Court balanced right to counsel against ethical enforcement and found no manifest injustice; defendant still represented by original counsel Latona	Denied — no manifest injustice shown

Key Cases Cited

Shrader v. CSX Transp., 70 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1995) (standard for motions for reconsideration in the Second Circuit)
Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1992) (grounds for reconsideration: change in law, new evidence, or clear error/manifest injustice)
Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977) (disqualification in the context of prior client/attorney communications and corporate representation)
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977) (requirement of careful analysis when applying ethical precedent to novel situations)
Board of Ed. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) (balancing enforcement of ethical rules with preservation of client rights)
Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualification principles)
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (conflict and disqualification analysis)
Filippi v. Elmont Union Free School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 722 F. Supp. 2d 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (disqualification analysis within this district)
W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976) (disqualification for communications with unrepresented parties)
Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualification for communications with represented parties)
In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (fees/forfeiture context; not directly applicable to disqualification)
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986) (class‑action disqualification balancing where unique facts warranted denial of disqualification)