Cornell v. Kirkpatrick, 665 F.3d 369

Background

Petitioner Cornell was convicted of two counts of Rape in the First Degree in Ontario County, New York arising from two separate July 2000 encounters with two victims during trips to Rochester, Monroe County.
Ontario County used a private vehicle exception to prosecute both rapes in one trial, invoking NY CPL § 20.40(4)(g) despite evidence one rape occurred in Monroe County.
Cornell did not object to venue at trial; he later argued Moore limited § 20.40(4)(g) to cases where the location of the offense is indeterminable.
Appellate Division held Cornell waived venue challenges and found counsel provided effective assistance; Cornell sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
District Court denied habeas relief on several grounds; on appeal the Second Circuit reversed, finding deficient performance and unreasonable application of Strickland, and remanded for writ of habeas corpus unless Monroe County intended to retry Victim #2.
The court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to object to venue for Victim #2 was an omissive error not supported by a sound trial strategy and that prejudice was shown, warranting relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s failure to object to venue was deficient performance	Cornell	State	Yes; deficiency shown under Strickland due to oversight rather than strategy.
Whether the failure to object to venue caused prejudice	Cornell	State	Yes; prejudice shown because venue was wrong and the jury likely would have acquitted Victim #2 if properly severed or instructed.
Exhaustion under AEDPA for ineffective assistance claim	Cornell	State	Exhausted; the State expressly admitted exhaustion for the federal claim in its district court briefing.
Whether Appellate Division’s decision denying relief was an unreasonable application of Strickland	Cornell	State	Yes; Appellate Division erred in applying Baldi and in denying prejudice; relief granted and remand ordered.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (clarifies ‘clearly established federal law’ for AEDPA)
Rosario v. Ercole, 601 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2010) (AEDPA deferential review under § 2254(d)(1))
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (U.S. 2009) (high threshold for reasonable application under AEDPA)
Davis v. Greiner, 428 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2005) (review of mixed questions of law and fact; deferential standard)
Cox v. Donnelly, 432 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 2005) (illustrates deficient performance where counsel’s conduct was not strategic)
People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137 (N.Y. 1981) (New York standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
People v. Greenberg, 89 N.Y.2d 553 (N.Y. 1997) (limits private vehicle exception where site of crime is identifiable)
People v. Moore, 46 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1978) (limits § 20.40(4)(g) to cases where the location is impossible to determine)
People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (N.Y. 1980) (prosecution bears burden to establish proper venue by preponderance)
Ribowsky v. New York, 77 N.Y.2d 284 (N.Y. 1991) (right to be tried in the county where offense occurred)
Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (federal standard not contrary to state standard for ineffective assistance)
Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1998) (remedies when trial counsel’s deficient performance is found)
Wise v. Smith, 735 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1984) (prejudice and spillover considerations in retrial decisions)