Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco
A141016A
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 21, 2017Background
- Bret Cornell, an off‑duty San Francisco police trainee, jogged in Golden Gate Park; two uniformed officers spotted him on Hippie Hill, found his demeanor "worried," and decided to approach. Cornell began running and was pursued by multiple officers; he was later caught at gunpoint, handcuffed, searched, taken to the station and to a hospital for a drug test (negative), and released after ~6 hours with a misdemeanor citation (Pen. Code § 148). Cornell lost his job as a trainee as a result.
- Cornell sued the arresting officers, the Chief, and the City asserting claims including false arrest/false imprisonment, negligence, tortious interference with economic advantage, and violation of Civil Code § 52.1 (the Bane Act).
- Trial was bifurcated: Phase I addressed assault and probable cause; the jury acquitted on assault but returned mixed factual findings about what officers perceived. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain and no probable cause to arrest. Defendants stipulated to negligence.
- Phase II the jury found for Cornell on tortious interference and on the Section 52.1 claim, awarding $575,231 in damages; the trial court later awarded $2,027,612.75 in attorney’s fees under Section 52.1.
- Defendants appealed challenging (1) the legal sufficiency of the probable cause ruling, (2) acceptance of an incomplete Phase I special verdict (jury deadlocked on one question), (3) failure to address statutory immunity under Penal Code § 847(b), and (4) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Section 52.1 claim and the fee award.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed in all respects: no probable cause; no reversible error in accepting incomplete verdict; Penal Code § 847(b) does not extend immunity beyond probable cause doctrine; Section 52.1 liability and fee award upheld under a specific‑intent standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had probable cause / reasonable suspicion to detain and arrest Cornell | Cornell argued officers lacked objective facts tying him to criminal activity; running, removing jacket, or avoiding eye contact were insufficient | Officers argued behavior (nervousness, flight, shedding jacket, High‑Path conduct) in a high‑crime area supplied reasonable suspicion/probable cause | Court: No reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Totality of facts did not particularize suspicion to Cornell; arrest unlawful. |
| Whether accepting Phase I verdict despite one unanswered question required mistrial | Cornell relied on Phase I jury findings and court’s legal ruling of no probable cause | Defendants argued the hung question (whether Cornell fled on Hippie Hill) was material and acceptance without an answer was reversible error | Court: Even assuming error, the unanswered question was not so material as to change result; denial of mistrial not abuse of discretion. |
| Whether Penal Code § 847(b) immunizes officers beyond probable cause (i.e., subjective or federal qualified immunity) | Cornell: § 847(b) tracks probable cause doctrine; no broader statutory immunity | Defendants: § 847(b)’s language (“reasonable cause to believe”) and policy support immunity for arrests made in good faith or akin to federal qualified immunity | Court: § 847(b) is coextensive with probable cause doctrine and does not import federal qualified immunity or provide broader immunity. |
| Whether evidence supported Section 52.1 (Bane Act) liability and attendant attorney fees | Cornell: unlawful arrest plus threats/coercion (gun‑pointing, interrogation, baseless citation leading to job loss) show intent or reckless disregard to deprive him of rights | Defendants: The jury rejected assault and excessive‑force finding; Bane Act requires coercion beyond inherent coercion in detention (Shoyoye), so false arrest alone insufficient | Court: Where an unlawful arrest is pleaded and proved, Section 52.1’s "threat, intimidation or coercion" element is met by proof of specific intent (or reckless disregard) to deprive rights; here evidence supported specific intent — Section 52.1 verdict and fees affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (objective moment‑of‑arrest probable cause standard)
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause is a practical, nontechnical test)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (flight can be a factor for reasonable suspicion; no bright‑line rule)
- People v. Casares, 62 Cal.4th 808 (reasonable‑suspicion must be particularized to person detained)
- People v. Souza, 9 Cal.4th 224 (refusal to stop or walk away does not automatically justify detention)
- Dragna v. White, 45 Cal.2d 469 (officer civil liability for unlawful arrest; historical rule governing false arrest liability)
- Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (scope of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 interpreted; Venegas II distinguished federal qualified immunity)
- Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329 (Bane Act / § 52.1 civil enforcement principles)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (excessive force analysis factors)
- Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App.4th 947 (overdetention case; held Section 52.1 requires coercion beyond inherent coercion in negligent jail overdetention)
- Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (specific‑intent standard for civil/criminal rights interference adopted as analytic model)