Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco
A141016
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 16, 2017Background
- Bret Cornell, an off-duty SFPD trainee in civilian clothes, jogged in Golden Gate Park; two uniformed officers (Brandt and Bodisco) observed him on Hippie Hill, found the area a known drug hotspot, and decided to approach him.
- Cornell walked away and then resumed running; officers gave chase, called for backup, and ultimately confronted and arrested him at gunpoint in the AIDS Memorial Grove after one officer shouted and/or pointed a firearm.
- Cornell was handcuffed, searched (only personal ID and spare handcuffs found), taken to the station, medically evaluated, drug-tested (negative), held for nearly six hours, cited for Penal Code §148 (evading/delaying an officer), and subsequently fired by SFPD under a trainee-termination policy.
- Cornell sued officers, Chief, and the City for false arrest, assault, negligence, tortious interference with economic advantage, and violation of the Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code §52.1). The trial was bifurcated: Phase I addressed assault and probable cause; Phase II addressed remaining torts and Section 52.1. Jury found no assault but made mixed factual findings on suspicion; court ruled no reasonable suspicion/probable cause as a legal matter.
- Defendants stipulated to negligence liability; Phase II jury found for Cornell on tortious interference and Section 52.1, awarding $575,231; court awarded $2,027,612.75 in attorney’s fees under Section 52.1. Defendants appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion/probable cause to detain and arrest Cornell | Cornell argued officers lacked particularized facts tying him to criminal activity; mere presence in a high-crime area, looking "worried," or running did not supply reasonable suspicion | Officers argued flight, discarding jacket, location (Hippie Hill), and behavior gave rise to reasonable suspicion and ultimately probable cause | Court held no reasonable suspicion or probable cause—totality of facts did not particularize Cornell as engaged in criminal activity, so arrest was unlawful |
| Whether accepting an incomplete Phase I special verdict (one unanswered question) required mistrial | Cornell argued verdict was sufficient and legal conclusion could be drawn from answered questions | Defendants argued the unanswered question (did officers reasonably believe Cornell fled on Hippie Hill) was material and denial of mistrial was error | Court held any error was not prejudicial; unanswered question would not have changed legal conclusion; denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether Penal Code §847(b) provides statutory immunity (analogous to federal qualified immunity) for false arrest | Cornell contended federal qualified-immunity concepts do not apply to state-law false arrest claims and §847(b) tracks probable cause only | Defendants argued §847(b) protects officers if they had reasonable cause to believe arrest lawful and urged importation of a qualified-immunity-like standard | Court held §847(b) is coextensive with probable cause doctrine and does not import a broader qualified-immunity standard; no separate statutory immunity beyond probable cause |
| Whether evidence supported submission and verdict on Section 52.1 (Bane Act) claim and fee award | Cornell argued gun-pointing, unlawful arrest, vindictive citation, interrogation, and conduct after arrest amounted to threats/intimidation/coercion and showed specific intent to violate rights | Defendants argued Bane Act requires coercion beyond coercion inherent in a seizure (relying on Shoyoye and Allen) and that false arrest alone is insufficient | Court held Section 52.1 properly submitted; where an unlawful arrest is proved, plaintiff must show defendants acted with specific intent to violate rights (Screws standard); jury could infer specific intent from threats, gun-pointing, retaliatory citation and conduct; verdict and fees affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (objective test for reasonableness of seizure)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (unprovoked flight in high-crime area may contribute to reasonable suspicion but no bright-line rule)
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause as a practical, nontechnical concept)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (objective standard for probable cause; arrest valid if facts known would lead reasonable officer to believe crime committed)
- Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (interpretation of Bane Act and scope of §52.1)
- Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329 (Bane Act / Section 52.1 scope and relation to other civil-rights remedies)
- Dragna v. White, 45 Cal.2d 469 (officer civil liability for unlawful arrest; historical baseline for §847 interpretation)
- Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (specific intent standard for civil rights interference under analogous federal law)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (attenuation doctrine referenced in analysis of taint, though not dispositive here)