167 Conn. App. 120
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- Cornelius purchased 78 Beacon St. (from Mercury) in 2004 but did not record the deed; taxes went unpaid for multiple years and the city conducted a 2007 tax sale.
- The city and tax collector (Rosario) provided notice to the record owner (Mercury) after searching land records; no record of Cornelius’s interest or tax payments existed.
- Cornelius sued to quiet title and brought a § 1983 due process claim, alleging inadequate notice; the trial court granted summary judgment to Rosario and the Appellate Court affirmed (Cornelius I). Certiorari petitions were denied.
- Rosario moved for attorney’s fees and costs under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-140, seeking (after supplementation) roughly $140k; the trial court awarded $40,824.11 but denied (as untimely) some trial-level fees and disallowed fees for defending Cornelius’s later motion to open the judgment.
- Both parties appealed: Cornelius challenged (1) that § 12-140 permits fees, (2) that he was the ‘‘delinquent taxpayer,’’ (3) that § 12-140 is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and (4) that Rosario’s fee motion was untimely; Rosario cross-appealed denial of certain fee requests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 12-140 permits recovery of attorney’s fees | § 12-140 allows only costs, not attorney’s fees | § 12-140 expressly includes attorney’s fees and municipal defense costs | Court: § 12-140 unambiguously authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees for defending tax-sale challenges |
| Identity of the "delinquent taxpayer" under § 12-140 | Mercury, as record owner, is the delinquent taxpayer | Cornelius, as actual owner who failed to pay taxes, is delinquent | Court: Cornelius admitted ownership and failed to pay taxes; he is the delinquent taxpayer under § 12-140 |
| Whether § 12-140 is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (fees in § 1983 suits) | § 1988 governs fee awards in § 1983 actions and preempts a less restrictive state statute | § 12-140 regulates state tax-collection matters within state competence and does not obstruct § 1988 | Court: No preemption; strong presumption against federal preemption in traditional state domain and § 12-140 does not frustrate § 1988’s purposes |
| Timeliness of fee motions under Practice Book § 11-21 (trial, appellate, postjudgment fees) | Rosario’s fee motion was untimely as to trial and postjudgment (motion to open) fees | Appellate fees timely; some trial fees should be allowable despite appeals | Court: Appellate fees timely and recoverable; trial-level fee motion untimely under § 11-21; fees for defending the motion to open were untimely and must be reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Cornelius v. Rosario, 138 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. 2012) (prior appeal resolving notice and record-owner issues)
- Singhaviroj v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2011) (standard for awarding fees to prevailing defendants under § 1988)
- Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57 (Conn. 2008) (framework for analyzing federal preemption and presumption against preemption)
- Fair Assessment in Realty Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (U.S. 1981) (limits on federal-court interference with state tax systems)
- Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58 (Conn. 1997) (allowing fee claims post-appeal in specific circumstances; distinguished from Practice Book § 11-21 rules)
- Traystman, Coric & Keramidas, P.C. v. Daigle, 282 Conn. 418 (Conn. 2007) (recognizing Practice Book § 11-21 as the specific postjudgment procedure for statutory attorney’s fees)