365 F. Supp. 3d 407
S.D. Ill.2019Background
- Royce Corley, convicted in federal court (child exploitation and pornography), brought two pro se § 1983 suits challenging investigative, arrest, and prosecution-related conduct and asserting related state-law claims against numerous public and private defendants.
- The suits (15 Civ. 1800 and 15 Civ. 9621) allege fabricated evidence, improper use of informants/stings, unlawful searches/seizures, unlawful disclosures of electronic and financial records, and various state-law torts.
- Many defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1),(2),(4),(5),(6); Judge Wittner and multiple corporate and government actors were defendants.
- The Court treated pleadings liberally due to pro se status, took judicial notice of public criminal records, and considered supplemental materials filed by Corley.
- The Court dismissed most claims and both actions in large part: 9621 was dismissed in full; in 1800 many defendants were dismissed entirely, leaving only limited claims (malicious abuse of process as to NYPD and certain unlawful-warrant-based search claims) to proceed against selected defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction over Facebook | Corley argues Facebook’s NY presence (registration, two NYC offices) supports jurisdiction | Facebook: incorporated in DE, principal place in CA; NY contacts insufficient for general jurisdiction and specific claims arise from out-of-state conduct | Court: No general or specific jurisdiction; Facebook dismissed (12(b)(2)) |
| Sufficiency of service on DA defendants | Corley contends defendants were served and relied on Marshal service; diligent communications show attempts | DA initially said not served, later conceded service occurred for all but one (waiver obtained) | Court: Denied DA motion to dismiss for insufficient service; service found adequate (12(b)(5)) |
| Effect of Heck v. Humphrey on §1983 claims challenging arrest/prosecution | Corley: dismissal of state indictment and other points mean claims not Heck-barred; post-conviction motions may succeed | Defendants: federal conviction stands; Heck bars claims that would imply invalidity of conviction | Court: Heck bars speedy trial, false arrest/imprisonment, fabrication-of-evidence, malicious prosecution and related claims that would invalidate conviction; those counts dismissed |
| Pleading adequacy for ECPA/SCA/RFPA/DPPA and other statutory/privacy claims | Corley alleges voluntary and compelled disclosures by providers and govt without process; asserts deprivation of privacy statutes | Defendants: pleadings are conclusory, lack facts tying disclosures to statutory violations or state action; RFPA inapplicable unless federal access; DPPA allegations speculative | Court: Statutory privacy claims dismissed for failure to plead factual basis or state action; RFPA defective until supplemented but still dismissed |
| Claims for substantive due process and conspiracy based on sting/informant use | Corley alleges outrageous government conduct, coercion of an underage informant, and conspiracies to manufacture evidence | Defendants: alleged informant/sting conduct lawful investigative measures; allegations conclusory/no facts showing conduct ‘‘shocking the conscience’’ or personal involvement | Court: Substantive due process and conspiracy claims dismissed for failure to plausibly allege conscience-shocking conduct or necessary facts |
| Unlawful searches & immunity (warranted searches) | Corley alleges warrants based on fabricated/stale evidence and altered online ads; seeks relief under §1983 | DA/NYPD: prosecutors and officers claim immunity (absolute for prosecutors, qualified for officers); conviction establishes probable cause for some searches | Court: Search-incident-to-arrest claim dismissed (conviction implies probable cause); workplace search dismissed (no privacy expectation pleaded); two warrant-based search claims survive pleadings, immunity issues deferred to later fact development |
| Malicious abuse of process claims | Corley alleges arrest to coerce cooperation in nuisance abatement and disclosures causing job loss | Defendants: prosecutorial acts in initiating prosecution are protected by absolute immunity; other acts may be privileged | Court: Abuse-of-process claim dismissed as to DA defendants (absolute immunity); survives as to NYPD defendants (qualified immunity unresolved) |
| Judicial immunity for Judge Wittner and dismissal of 9621 | Corley alleges Judge Wittner set up a "quasi-grand jury," steered assignment, and engaged in non-judicial investigatory acts | Wittner: absolute judicial immunity shields judge for judicial acts; many allegations concern judicial functions | Court: Most claims against Wittner barred by judicial immunity; 9621 Complaint dismissed in full (remaining state claims declined for supplemental jurisdiction) |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§1983 claims that would imply invalidity of conviction require favorable termination)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute prosecutorial immunity for acts intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom or deliberate indifference)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead factual content to state plausible claim)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must nudge claim from conceivable to plausible)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (standards for general jurisdiction over corporations)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (general jurisdiction requires affiliations rendering defendant essentially at home)