Corey Kidd v. United States, 929 F.3d 578

In 2011 Corey Kidd pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence; the underlying offense was aiding and abetting armed robbery of controlled substances (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2118(a), 2118(c)(1)).
Kidd filed a § 2255 motion in 2016 seeking to vacate his § 924(c) conviction, arguing the underlying offense is not a "crime of violence."
The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on whether the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.
Kidd argued the robbery statute can be satisfied by "intimidation," which he contended does not require the threatened use of physical force and therefore cannot meet the force clause in § 924(c)(3)(A).
The Eighth Circuit analyzed whether armed robbery of controlled substances (including when committed by intimidation) categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).
The court concluded intimidation is a threat of force and that the offense categorically qualifies under the force clause, so Davis (invalidating the residual clause) did not help Kidd.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether aiding and abetting armed robbery of controlled substances qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause)	Kidd: "Intimidation" does not require threatened physical force, so the offense lacks an element of use/threatened use of physical force	Government: "Intimidation" is a threat of force; robbery-by-intimidation therefore involves the threatened use of violent physical force and meets the force clause	Held: The offense categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because intimidation is a threat of physical force; aider/abettor treated as principal
Whether the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis (invalidating the residual clause) invalidates Kidd's § 924(c) conviction	Kidd: Davis renders the residual clause void, so his conviction cannot rest on an invalid definition of "crime of violence"	Government: The force clause applies here, so Davis (residual-clause ruling) is inapplicable	Held: Davis does not afford relief because the force clause governs; conviction stands

Estell v. United States, 924 F.3d 1291 (8th Cir. 2019) (bank robbery and carjacking by intimidation qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A))
United States v. Harper, 869 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2017) (threats conveying a risk of bodily harm constitute threats of violent force)
United States v. Wright, 957 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1992) (defining "intimidation" as the threat of force)
Allen v. United States, 836 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussion on intent requirement for intimidation)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (Supreme Court invalidating the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague)