790 F.3d 1088
10th Cir.2015Background
- Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant operators (Dow/Rockwell) mishandled radioactive waste; neighbors sued alleging harm to property values and nuisance under Colorado law and claims under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA).
- After a lengthy pretrial period, a jury awarded plaintiffs compensatory, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest; district court entered judgment for plaintiffs.
- On first appeal the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment as to PAA claims because jury instructions on the definition of a "nuclear incident" were too permissive, and remanded for further proceedings; the court expressly upheld the jury instructions on Colorado nuisance law.
- On remand plaintiffs disclaimed invoking the PAA and sought entry of judgment on the existing state-law nuisance verdict; defendants argued (1) the PAA expressly preempts and precludes state recovery when a nuclear incident is alleged but unproven and (2) the prior appellate mandate precluded reinstatement of any part of the verdict.
- The district court accepted both defenses and denied entry of judgment; plaintiffs appealed. The Tenth Circuit majority rejects PAA field preemption and holds the mandate did not bar entry of judgment on the existing state-law nuisance verdict; the case is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with that view.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Price-Anderson Act expressly preempts and precludes state-law recovery when a nuclear incident is alleged but not proven | Cook: PAA does not preempt state tort claims for lesser occurrences; PAA provides federal forum and limited conflict preemption only | Dow/Rockwell: PAA occupies field; if a nuclear incident is asserted but unproven, state recovery is barred (complete/field preemption) | Court: Rejected defendants’ express/field preemption theory; PAA does not bar state-law nuisance claims for lesser occurrences; presumption against preemption controls |
| Whether defendants forfeited the field-preemption argument by failing to develop it on first appeal | Cook: Defendants forfeited any field-preemption argument in first appeal; law of the case bars raising it on remand | Dow/Rockwell: They had preserved/raised field-preemption and may press it on remand | Held: Forfeited — prior panel said defendants did not develop that argument; law of the case prevents relitigation |
| Whether the prior appellate mandate barred entry of judgment on the existing state-law nuisance verdict | Cook: Prior panel reversed/remanded for proceedings “not inconsistent” with opinion; it upheld nuisance jury instructions and did not specifically preclude entering judgment on the unaffected state-law verdict | Dow/Rockwell: Mandate and Cook I’s language setting aside “the verdict” required vacatur of the entire verdict and precluded reinstatement without retrial | Held: Mandate did not specifically preclude entry of judgment on the existing nuisance verdict; district court should enter judgment unless further remand proceedings are required consistent with the opinion |
| Remedy on remand (retrial vs. entry of judgment) | Cook: Plaintiffs sought entry of judgment on existing nuisance verdict to avoid needless retrial; the court favors judgment entry given lack of error affecting state claim | Dow/Rockwell: If verdict was vacated or preempted, retrial required; concurrence would remand for a new trial | Held: Majority directs district court to enter judgment on the existing state-law nuisance verdict (concurrence would instead remand for retrial) |
Key Cases Cited
- Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (presumption against preemption; historic state police powers)
- Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (adopt reading disfavouring preemption when statute ambiguous)
- Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (heightened presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regulation)
- El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (describing PAA as an unusual preemption provision that resembles complete preemption in some respects)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (complete preemption doctrine and effect on removal)
- Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (Congress left room for state tort remedies despite federal nuclear safety regulation)
- Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (PAA motivated by concern about catastrophic nuclear liability and industry stability)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (complete preemption background)
- Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (federal regulatory scheme can coexist with state tort remedies; example in automobile safety)
- Dish Network Corp. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 772 F.3d 856 (district court may enter new judgment on remand consistent with appellate opinion)
