Cook v. IPC International Corp.
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4814
| 7th Cir. | 2012Background
- Cook, plaintiff-appellant, alleged sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII against IPC; jury verdict for IPC; district court denied post-trial relief.
- Spann, Cook's immediate supervisor, made sexually offensive comments to women, favored male subordinates, and Cook complained repeatedly.
- Colburne, IPC regional manager, transferred Cook from the Alton mall to another IPC site, possibly a demotion, increasing commute and changing to a line position.
- Cook was told she was not fired during the transfer discussion; two days later Spann told her to clean out her locker and surrender keys, leading Cook to infer she was fired.
- The jury found Cook was fired but did not find Spann was the IPC decisionmaker; the district judge advised that 'the sole decisionmaker' was Spann, prompting appellate concern.
- The court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to instructional and verdict-form errors concerning the 'sole decisionmaker' issue and related causation concepts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 'sole decisionmaker' instruction was reversible error | Cook argues instruction misled jury by requiring sole decisionmaker; permits cat's paw liability via others. | IPC asserts Spann was the decisionmaker; instruction properly identified sole decisionmaker as the relevant standard. | Instruction error requiring sole decisionmaker; prejudicial and reversible. |
| Whether cat's paw/ motivating-factor theories were properly applied | Cook contends supervisor's discriminatory motive can be imputed to IPC without sole-decisionmaker proof. | IPC maintains cat's paw theory was not established and lacks necessity given no other evidence of sole decisionmaker. | Cat's paw framework muddled; not dispositive; verdict reversal warranted for other errors. |
| Whether 'motivating factor' causation was properly used in this case | Discrimination motive could be a factor even if a lawful reason existed; damages should follow if not proven otherwise. | Court should not rely on 'motivating factor' as sole basis where evidence fails to show supervisor deliberate discrimination. | The discussion of motivating factor was irrelevant to the outcome given the instructional error. |
| Whether the case should be retried | New trial appropriate due to flawed instruction and verdict form. | No need for retrial if jury correctly found facts. | Judgment reversed and remanded for a new trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (adverse action remedies and retaliation concepts discussed)
- Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (U.S. 2009) (retaliation and protected activity in Title VII context)
- Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1977) (motivating-factor causation framework)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (cat's paw liability and supervisor's influence on employer action)
- Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990) (origin of cat's paw theory in employment discrimination)
- Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (U.S. 2003) (clarifies 'motivating factor' and related doctrines)
- Hossack v. Floor Covering Associates of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2007) (application of motivating-factor framework in Seventh Circuit)
- Fine v. Ryan Int'l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2002) (references to causation standards in Title VII context)