Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corporation
915 F.3d 788
| Fed. Cir. | 2019Background
- Continental Circuits owned four related patents (’582, ’560, ’105, ’912) claiming multilayer electrical devices with a "tooth" surface structure and methods to form them to improve layer adhesion.
- The patents disclose a preferred technique—a double (or repeated) desmear/swell-and-etch process using a specific dielectric (Probelec XB 7081)—but the claims do not expressly recite a repeated desmear process.
- Continental sued Intel and related parties for infringement of multiple device, article, process, and product-by-process claims that include terms like "surface," "removal," and "etching" (the "Category 1 Terms").
- The district court construed the Category 1 Terms to require that the dielectric surface be "produced by a repeated desmear process," relying on specification statements, prosecution history (an expert declaration), and inventor documents; the parties then stipulated to noninfringement and judgment entered.
- On appeal, Continental challenged only the claim construction; the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo and vacated the noninfringement judgment, holding the district court erred in importing the repeated-desmear limitation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Continental) | Defendant's Argument (Intel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Category 1 Terms ("surface", "removal", "etching") must be limited to a repeated desmear process | Claims don’t recite a repeated desmear; specification’s preferred double-desmear disclosure should not limit claim scope | Specification and prosecution history repeatedly distinguish single-pass desmear; prosecution expert and inventor documents corroborate limitation | Reversed: no clear and unmistakable disavowal; Category 1 Terms get their plain and ordinary meaning (no repeated-desmear requirement) |
| Whether specification’s references to the double desmear amount to a disavowal or lexicographic definition | Preferred-embodiment language ("one technique", "can be carried out", "a way") does not clearly limit claims | Statements describing "the present invention" as differing from prior art support limiting construction | Reversed: disclosure of preferred embodiment and contrasts with prior art do not constitute clear disavowal or lexicographic definition |
| Whether prosecution history/expert declaration created a clear disclaimer | Applicant’s expert merely explained an embodiment to overcome examiner rejections; not a clear disclaimer | Applicant’s prosecution statements described "two separate" passes and rebutted examiner—supports limitation | Reversed: prosecution statements did not clearly and unambiguously disclaim broader claim scope |
| Whether process steps can be read into product claims here | Product claims not limited by process unless patentee made process "an essential part" of invention | Intrinsic record and inventor admissions show process is essential to achieve teeth | Reversed: patentees did not make the repeated desmear an essential part; process limitation improperly imported |
Key Cases Cited
- Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (establishes standard of review for claim construction and subsidiary factual findings)
- Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (en banc) (claims construed in view of specification and prosecution history; plain and ordinary meaning)
- Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 (specification and intrinsic evidence considered for claim meaning)
- Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (claim construction principles)
- Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (specification usually dispositive for claim meaning)
- Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362 (requirement for clear disavowal to limit claims)
- CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (patentee-as-lexicographer standard)
- Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (expressions of manifest exclusion required for disavowal)
- Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321 (intrinsic evidence and disavowal principles)
- Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (when "present invention" language can limit claims)
- Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121 (context required to limit claims via "present invention")
- Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (single-embodiment disclosure does not automatically limit claims)
- Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313 (disavowal standards)
- Vanguard Prods. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 234 F.3d 1370 (product claims not limited to process unless process is essential)
- Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361 (process steps may be part of product claim if patentee made them essential)
- C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858 (extrinsic evidence is less significant than intrinsic record)
- Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 366 F.3d 1311 (role of extrinsic evidence)