344 F. Supp. 3d 279
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Pequot Tribe and Connecticut agreed to amend longstanding "Pequot Procedures" (secretarial procedures under IGRA) to exempt a joint-venture commercial operator (MMCT) from exclusivity clauses so MMCT could run commercial casinos without stripping the State of tribal royalty payments; the Secretary of the Interior has not approved those amendments.
- Plaintiffs (Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe) sued, arguing that under IGRA and implementing regs the Secretary was required to approve (or be deemed to have approved) the amendments within statutory timeframes and to publish approval in the Federal Register; they sought APA relief compelling agency action.
- MGM, a commercial casino developer with competing proposals (Bridgeport) and an existing Springfield, MA casino, moved to intervene as a defendant, arguing Secretary approval would harm its competitive interests; the court allowed MGM to intervene as of right.
- The Department had approved analogous amendments to the Mohegan Compact and published notice, but refused to approve the Pequot amendments, returning them to preserve the status quo while stating insufficient information to decide.
- The central legal question: whether IGRA’s timing and "deemed approved" mechanics that apply to tribal-state compacts under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8) also apply to secretarial procedures and amendments imposed under § 2710(d)(7).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2710(d)(8)’s 45‑day "deemed approved" rule applies to secretarial procedures or amendments under § 2710(d)(7) | IGRA’s scheme and purpose require the same approval deadlines for procedures derived via the mediation/remedial process; therefore Secretary was required to deem the Pequot amendments approved after the statutory period and publish notice | IGRA’s text and regs tie the 45‑day deemed‑approval rule specifically to tribal‑state compacts (§ 2710(d)(8)); secretarial procedures are governed separately by § 2710(d)(7) and are not subject to those timing mandates | Court held the statutory text is plain: § 2710(d)(8) deadlines apply to tribal‑state compacts, not to secretarial procedures; plaintiffs failed to identify a nondiscretionary duty and claims dismissed for failure to state a claim. |
| Whether Chevron deference applies to Interior’s litigation position | Plaintiffs: even if agency interpretation exists, the Department’s litigation position here is not entitled to Chevron deference | Defendants: IGRA is ambiguous and agency interpretation should receive Chevron deference | Court declined to apply Chevron (agency litigation briefs and unexplained positions insufficient); construed IGRA de novo and found the text plain in favor of defendants. |
| Standing to intervene (MGM) | N/A (MGM is intervenor) | N/A | Court found MGM has Article III standing (competitor standing and competitive disadvantage theories), timely motion, protectable interests, and inadequate representation by government, so MGM may intervene as of right. |
| Availability of APA mandamus/compel relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) | Plaintiffs: Secretary’s failure to treat amendments as deemed approved and to publish notice is agency action unlawfully withheld; seek order compelling publication | Defendants: No discrete, nondiscretionary duty to act within the claimed timeframe; § 2710(d)(8) does not apply to procedures | Held that plaintiffs failed to show a discrete mandatory duty; APA relief and mandamus inappropriate; claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized, and imminent injury)
- Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (§ 706(1) can only compel a discrete, mandatory agency action)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two‑step framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretation)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must state plausible claim)
- Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (cardinal canon: give effect to statute’s plain meaning)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (factors informing judicial estoppel)
- Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizes competitor standing)
- Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (intervenor standing in competitive contexts)
- Louisiana Energy & Power Authority v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (competitor injury from regulatory changes confers standing)