343 Conn. 90
Conn.2022Background
- Germaine Gilbert, a judicial marshal, alleged severe and pervasive sexual harassment by a colleague (2006–2012) and claimed the Judicial Branch retaliated by transferring her to more distant courthouses. She filed administrative claims alleging violations of Connecticut law (§§ 46a-60 and 46a-58(a)) and Title VII (as a predicate to § 46a-58(a)).
- The CHRO human rights referee found discrimination, awarded seven days’ back pay (with prejudgment and postjudgment interest), $50,000 emotional distress damages, $47,637 in attorney’s fees, and ordered that Gilbert be given the option to return to her original courthouse.
- The Judicial Branch appealed, arguing (inter alia) that CHRO lacked authority to award emotional distress and attorney’s fees under § 46a-58 based on Title VII, that the state’s sovereign immunity barred interest awards, that Gilbert’s discovery failures required preclusion of emotional-distress damages, and that the injunction was overbroad.
- The trial court held that emotional distress damages and attorney’s fees are available under § 46a-58 when predicated on Title VII, that sovereign immunity did not bar interest, but vacated the emotional-distress award (for discovery noncompliance) and vacated the reinstatement injunction as overbroad.
- The Judicial Branch appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court; the CHRO cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed availability of remedies under § 46a-58 predicated on Title VII, reversed as to interest (sovereign immunity bars interest awards absent express waiver), and remanded for a new damages hearing and for reconsideration/narrowing of the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Branch) | Defendant's Argument (CHRO / Gilbert) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CHRO may find Title VII violations and award emotional distress and attorney’s fees under § 46a-58(a)/§ 46a-86(c) | Federal law limits final adjudication and damages under Title VII to courts/EEOC procedures; Truelove confines employment claims to § 46a-60 remedies | § 46a-58(a) explicitly incorporates rights "secured by . . . laws of the United States" and § 46a-86(c) authorizes damages/fees for § 46a-58 violations; state agencies may apply federal law as predicate for state remedies | CHRO may identify Title VII violations as the factual predicate to § 46a-58(a) claims and award emotional distress and attorney’s fees under § 46a-86(c) (affirmed) |
| Whether sovereign immunity bars prejudgment/postjudgment interest on CHRO awards under § 46a-86 | State immunity not waived as to interest; interest requires express waiver | Interest is inherent to making victims whole when awarding back pay | State sovereign immunity bars interest absent an express legislative waiver; award of interest vacated (reversed) |
| Whether discovery noncompliance required preclusion of all emotional distress damages | Gilbert refused to produce complete medical/therapy records; severe sanction (preclusion) appropriate | Referee gave Gilbert a choice: produce records or be limited to garden-variety distress; limited sanction was within referee discretion | Trial court erred to vacate all emotional-distress damages; but CHRO abused discretion by admitting treatment/medication testimony beyond garden-variety limits — remand for new damages hearing (partial reversal) |
| Whether injunction requiring branch to give Gilbert option to return to original courthouse was improper/overbroad | Injunction unduly interferes with employer’s assignment discretion, is untailored, and unnecessary now (harasser later retired) | Reinstatement vindicates public policy against punishing victims and remedies retaliatory transfers; injunction may be tailored | Trial court erred to vacate the injunction as a matter of law; remand to allow CHRO to clarify findings and to craft a narrowly tailored injunction (remand) |
Key Cases Cited
- Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (state courts/agencies may have concurrent roles with federal courts under Title VII)
- Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (state administrative adjudications can have preclusive effect and provide adequate process)
- New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (Title VII contemplates state administrative and judicial enforcement; state remedies are primary)
- Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) (no-interest rule: sovereign immunity bars interest absent express waiver)
- Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549 (1988) (prejudgment interest on back pay against the government not recoverable without explicit waiver)
- Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Truelove & Maclean, Inc., 238 Conn. 337 (1996) (limits on bringing employment discrimination claims under § 46a-58 versus § 46a-60)
- Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 265 Conn. 127 (2003) (discussing back-pay and remedial aims of antidiscrimination statutes)
- Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542 (1987) (state application of no-interest rule and strict construction of sovereign-immunity waivers)
- Hicks v. State, 297 Conn. 798 (2010) (postjudgment interest against the state not available absent express waiver)
- Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665 (2004) (statutory history and broad remedial purpose of § 46a-58)