Conley v. United States
79 A.3d 270
| D.C. | 2013Background
- In 2009, DC enacted D.C.Code § 22-2511 making it a felony to be voluntarily in a vehicle knowing a firearm is present (PMVCF).
- Antwaun Conley was charged with PMVCF along with possessory offenses; jury found him guilty only of PMVCF and he was sentenced to 34 months.
- Trial court instructed PMVCF elements: voluntary presence, firearm in vehicle, knowledge of firearm, and unlawful carriage/transport.
- Council explained PMVCF to address difficulty proving possession when multiple occupants share a vehicle; proposed bill added voluntariness and an affirmative defense.
- Conley challenged the statute as unconstitutional on appeal; the majority held § 22-2511 unconstitutional on its face, reversing the PMVCF conviction and remanding to dismiss with prejudice.
- Conley’s acquittals on other offenses left PMVCF as the sole basis for conviction; the court remanded to vacate that conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 22-2511 unconstitutionally shift the burden of persuasion? | Conley argues burden shifts to prove voluntariness (an element) or involuntariness defense; violates due process. | Government argues severability and possible construction to avoid shifting; seeks saving interpretation if possible. | Yes; statute facially shifts burden and is unconstitutional as written. |
| Does Lambert v. California require knowledge of a legal duty for conviction under PMVCF? | Conley asserts Lambert requires actual knowledge of a duty when the act is a passive crime of omission. | Government contends Lambert does not apply or that PMVCF is distinguishable and could be saved by interpretation. | Yes; due process requires knowledge of or probability of knowledge of the duty, making PMVCF unconstitutional on its face. |
| Can the statute be severed to save the remainder of the act? | Conley argues severing subsection (b) could preserve the rest of § 22-2511 if permissible. | Government argues severability should save portions of the act if possible. | Severance cannot cure the due process defects; the entire statute is unconstitutional. |
| Would construction to require knowledge of illegality avoid due process problems? | Conley advocates a construction requiring knowledge of illegality to avoid notice problems. | Government contends such construction is not the statute’s plain meaning and cannot be presumed. | Even with construction, the statute remains unconstitutional due to Lambert-like notice concerns. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957) (due process limits on punishment for failure to act when no notice of duty exists)
- McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744 (D.C.1978) (dangerous or deleterious devices impose heightened notice of regulation)
- McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371 (D.C.2005) (Lambert applied to dangerous weapon regulation; ignorance of law principle discussed)
- Lambert v. California, concurring or related discussion, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957) (origin of an unusual-duty notice principle in due process)