Coningford v. Rhode Island
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10159
1st Cir.2011Background
- Coningford, a Rhode Island state prisoner, was charged with second‑degree child molestation involving a seven‑year‑old friend of his son.
- Prior bad acts evidence, i.e., testimony from two other young men claiming past molestation by Coningford, was sought to be admitted under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b).
- The trial court admitted the prior acts as showing a common plan or modus operandi and balancing probative value against prejudice.
- At trial, the State presented the prior acts evidence alongside the complainant and an investigating detective; Coningford did not testify and was convicted; the court sentenced him to 30 years (twenty to serve).
- On direct appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed; on federal habeas review, the district court found exhaustion problems and lack of merit, which the First Circuit reviews de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coningford exhausted his federal claim | Coningford argued a federal claim via general fairness assertions; he contends exhaustion was satisfied. | Rhode Island proceedings did not put the federal constitutional claim before the state court. | Claim unexhausted; not presented face‑up as a federal claim. |
| Whether the admission of prior bad acts was a due process violation on the merits | Admission violated Fourth/Fifth/Sixth/Fourteenth Amendments by showing propensity and unfair prejudice. | State court rulings were within the broad spectrum of plausible evidentiary rulings; no due process violation. | No unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; admission did not render trial fundamentally unfair. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (exhaustion prerequisite for federal habeas review)
- Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.2010) (de novo review of district court, exhaustion and merits)
- Adelson v. DiPaola, 131 F.3d 259 (1st Cir.1997) (five ways to fairly present federal claim in state court)
- Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1994) (fair presentation requires substantial similarity of constitutional analysis)
- Nadworny v. Fair, 872 F.2d 1093 (1st Cir.1989) (test for fair presentation and exhaustion)
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (due process limits on use of evidence; not on-point for state law rules)
- Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.2002) (clarifies AEDPA standards and establishment of clearly established law)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (clearly established federal law must be from Supreme Court—not lower courts)
- Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.2002) (application of clearly established law in the First Circuit)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (unreasonable application of law; standard for habeas review)
- Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (fundamental fairness narrowly defined)
- Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987) (unreasonable application requires boundary on lower court precedents)
- Petrillo v. O'Neill, 428 F.3d 41 (1st Cir.2005) (state‑law error not per se federal error unless constitutional)
- Dougan v. Ponte, 727 F.2d 199 (1st Cir.1984) (federal review of state evidentiary rulings)
- State v. Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145 (R.I.2010) (similarities between state and federal evidentiary rules)
- State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140 (R.I.2009) (state evidentiary framework aligned with federal counterpart)
- State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879 (R.I.1996) (state‑law claim treated as not automatically federal equivalent)