945 F.3d 83
2d Cir.2019Background
- TRC (Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc.) purchased ~100 acres in Pomona intending to build a rabbinical college but never filed formal development applications.
- Pomona enacted four zoning amendments at different times: Local Law No. 1 (2001) (special permits, lot-size rules); Local Law No. 5 (2004) (broadened "educational institution" definition, allowed dormitories); Local Law No. 1 (2007) ("Dormitory Law") and Local Law No. 5 (2007) ("Wetlands Law") (both tightened limits on dormitories and wetlands buffers).
- Intense public reaction followed January 2007 press reports that TRC planned housing for ~1,000 students and ~4,500 residents; new trustees elected in March 2007 campaigned opposing that project.
- Tartikov sued (2007) alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, RLUIPA, FHA, and New York law; after motions and a bench trial the district court found religious animus tainting all four laws and entered broad injunctive relief.
- On appeal, the Second Circuit held Tartikov lacked Article III standing for claims premised on speculative, as‑yet‑unapplied zoning restrictions (e.g., free‑exercise, substantial‑burden RLUIPA, FHA, and related claims) and vacated those parts; it affirmed the finding of discriminatory purpose/effect as to the 2007 Dormitory and Wetlands Laws, reversed as to the 2001 and 2004 Laws, and narrowed the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing for as‑applied/substantial‑burden and related claims | Tartikov argued the laws (facial & as‑applied) already burden its religious exercise and thus are ripe and justiciable | Pomona argued TRC never applied for permits or submitted concrete plans, so harms are speculative | Court: No standing for those claims; vacated judgment on them and remanded to dismiss (injury is conjectural) |
| Equal‑protection / discriminatory intent for Local Law No. 1 (2001) | TRC pointed to timing (response to YSV), consultant comments, trustee remarks as evidence of anti‑Hasidic animus | Pomona argued the amendments were legitimate planning responses to consultant recommendations and did not single out religious uses | Court: Reversed district court; evidence insufficient to show religious purpose or discriminatory effect for 2001 Law |
| Equal‑protection / discriminatory intent for Local Law No. 5 (2004) | TRC argued Village opposition to nearby Ramapo actions and political statements showed animus and 2004 law was a vehicle to block Hasidic expansion | Pomona showed 2004 law liberalized regulations (allowed dorms, broadened definitions) and was adopted before knowledge of TRC purchase | Court: Reversed district court; insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent or effect for 2004 Law |
| Equal‑protection / discriminatory intent & effect for 2007 Dormitory and Wetlands Laws | Tartikov relied on timing (post‑press), inflammatory public comments, campaign promises by newly elected trustees, vote choices, and provisions that would practically block TRC’s project | Pomona emphasized legitimate planning/environmental concerns and that some provisions mirror other municipalities’ rules | Court: Affirmed district court as to 2007 laws — found discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect (laws would substantially burden TRC’s proposed on‑campus housing) |
| Remedy / scope of injunction and RLUIPA equal‑terms/exclusion cross‑appeal | Tartikov sought broad relief (process mandates, exemptions from special permits, segmented SEQRA review) | Pomona argued injunction exceeded appropriate relief and conflicted with state procedures/statutes; also defended summary judgment on equal‑terms/exclusion RLUIPA claims | Court: Affirmed injunction only insofar as it bars enforcement of the 2007 Dormitory and Wetlands Laws; vacated and narrowed broader relief that conflicted with state law or was speculative; affirmed dismissal/summary judgment on equal‑terms and total‑exclusion RLUIPA claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors and sensitive inquiry for discerning discriminatory purpose)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete and imminent injury; conjectural harms insufficient)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (clarifies Article III injury‑in‑fact requirement)
- Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (definition of discriminatory purpose in equal‑protection context)
- Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (stigmatic injury and standing for equal‑treatment claims)
- Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) (standing must be demonstrated for each claim and form of relief)
- Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA / equal‑protection analysis in zoning disputes)
- Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583 (1986) (New York law on special treatment and limits for educational and religious uses)