Commonwealth v. Wimer, 99 N.E.3d 778

Defendant Jeffrey Wimer pleaded guilty in 2013 to two counts of open and gross lewdness (G. L. c. 272, § 16) for masturbating in front of his girlfriend’s nine‑year‑old daughter.
The sentencing judge ordered registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C–178Q) based on a "second and subsequent adjudication or conviction" of open and gross lewdness.
Wimer filed postconviction challenges including a motion to correct an illegal sentence (Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a)) arguing the two convictions were adjudicated in the same proceeding and thus did not constitute a “second and subsequent” conviction.
The trial judge denied the Rule 30(a) motion after a nonevidentiary hearing; the defendant appealed and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.
The core legal question was statutory interpretation: whether two convictions entered in the same judicial proceeding can satisfy the statutory phrase "second and subsequent adjudication or conviction" to trigger mandatory registration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether two convictions entered in the same proceeding count as a "second and subsequent adjudication or conviction" under G. L. c. 6, § 178C	The Commonwealth: multiple convictions, even if adjudicated together, satisfy the statute (defer to Board's regulation interpreting the phrase to include multiple convictions on same arraignment date)	Wimer: "second and subsequent" requires a prior conviction that occurred before a later conviction; convictions entered together are not subsequent	Court held: "second and subsequent adjudication or conviction" requires the second conviction to follow (be later than) the first; convictions adjudicated in the same proceeding are not "subsequent," so mandatory registration did not apply

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594 (2013) (legislative purpose and context for sex offender statute)
United Church of Religious Science v. Assessors of Attleboro, 372 Mass. 280 (1977) (use of "and" requires both elements be present)
Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786 (2018) (construe related statutory provisions together)
Alves's Case, 451 Mass. 171 (2008) (agency deference limited to ambiguous statutes where interpretation is reasonable)
Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527 (2015) (statutory interpretation should avoid rendering words superfluous)