Lead Opinion
General Motors Corporation (General Motors), as a workers’ compensation self-insurer, compensated Steven Alves for a work-related injury. Because it was Alves’s second injury, General Motors was entitled to reimbursement of some of that compensation, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 37. The reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (board) held that there is no statute of limitations applicable to General Motors’s filing its claim for reimbursement, where Alves’s injury occurred while the 1985 version of the statute was in effect. The Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (Fund) appealed to the Appeals Court. We granted the Fund’s application for direct appellate review and now affirm the decision of the board.
In 1991, § 37 was amended again to add a two-year statute of limitations on the filing of claims for reimbursement for injuries occurring after December 23, 1991. St. 1991, c. 398 §§ 71, 111.
Steven Alves was employed by General Motors. He suffered a work-related injury within the meaning of G. L. c. 152, § 37, in January, 1987. General Motors began paying reimbursable weekly benefits to Alves on March 10, 1989, ending with a lump-sum payment on March 8, 1991. In April, 2003, General
In July, 2003, at a conference before an administrative judge, held pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 10A, the Fund was ordered to reimburse General Motors.
The Fund appealed and the board summarily affirmed the judge’s decision, in December, 2005. The Fund appealed to the Appeals Court. G. L. c. 152, § 12 (2).
Discussion. As the Fund points out, its appeal focuses on “a discrete legal issue concerning the timeliness of the self-insurer’s petition for reimbursement” pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 37. That “discrete legal issue” involves the validity of the board’s interpretation of the 1985 version of § 37. “The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to substantial deference.” Gate-ley’s Case,
The Fund’s argument is premised on the assumption that where a statute does not specify a statute of limitations, courts always borrow one.
Although it is true that courts often borrow a statute of limitations when none is supplied, it is not always the case. See State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward,
As the administrative judge stated in his written decision in this case, the board had already analyzed, in Walsh, the statute of limitations issue raised by the 1985 version of the statute. In Walsh, supra, the board first quoted the administrative judge at length, whose decision pointed out:
“Within its various Sections, the statute contains explicit language limiting the period for which certain benefits shall be paid, limitations on when various notices must be filed by employers and insurers, and also contains limitations on the time within which certain claims for benefits must be filed. Thus, the Legislature included specific limitations where it wanted them to be applied — and conversely, excluded them where it did not want limitations to apply. Only in the most arcane and unlikely circumstances would it be necessary or appropriate to find guidance in analogous statutes than within the Workers’ Compensation Act itself. . . . [Moreover if] the Legislature felt that the Trust Fund would have been prejudiced in some way that required retroactive application of this [1991] limitations period, then it could have enacted a retroactive limitation on petitions, an action it specifically chose not to do here.”
Id. at 152.
In its Walsh appeal, the Fund urged the board to borrow statutes of limitations, particularly G. L. c. 152, § 41, or G. L. c. 260, § 2. Id. at 153-154. The board rejected these arguments for several reasons. It stated that the entire concept of borrowing as it pertains to § 37 had “no bearing on the [Walsh] case.” Id. at 153, citing
“To apply this statute of limitations to the 1985 version of § 37 would render the Legislature’s prospective characterization of this provision utterly meaningless. Indeed, if the Legislature had intended the new statute of limitations to have retroactive application, ‘it would have been natural for the Legislature to express such an intention,’ as it did for the vast majority of the amendments enacted in 1991. See St. 1991, c. 398, § 107. Where there is such a plain and rational meaning to be applied, we are obliged to apply it, rather than set off on an interpretive quest. See O’Brien v. M.B.T.A.,405 Mass. 439 , 443-444 (1989), quoting Commonwealth v. Vickey,381 Mass. 762 , 767 (1980) (‘a basic tenet of statutory construction is to give the words their plain meaning in light of the aim of the Legislature, and when the statute appears not to provide for an eventuality, there is no justification for judicial legislation’).”
Id. at 154.
Moreover, the board explicitly rejected the Fund’s argument that the board should borrow the statute of limitations from G. L. c. 152, § 41, as “meritless,” stating that § 41 covers employee claims for compensation, whereas § 37 covers claims for reimbursement.
Although it is outside the record in this case, we note that the Fund appealed from the Walsh decision to a single justice of the Appeals Court. The appeal was dismissed because the Fund and the insurer settled.
We will not substitute our judgment for that of an administrative agency if its interpretation of a statute is reasonable. Massachusetts Med. Soc’y v. Commissioner of Ins.,
The Fund argues that concluding that no statute of limitations applies to the 1985 version of the statute would cause present employers to be assessed unfairly for the costs of reimbursements and benefit those employers who went underassessed in the 1985-1991 period. We do not consider this argument because, as the Fund concedes, there is nothing in the record indicating that this issue was raised before the board and no evidence that it is true.
We are aware that the board’s interpretation of the statute results in insurers that made payments for injuries that occurred between 1985 and 1991 having an unlimited time to file claims for reimbursement pursuant to § 37, whereas insurers who pay for injuries sustained after 1991 only have two years in which to file for reimbursement. However, the Legislature is presumed
Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, the Fund has not met its burden to show that the board’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the board’s decision.
So ordered.
Notes
The 1991 statute of limitations is a “rolling statute of limitations.” Walsh v. Bertolino Beef Co., 16 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 151, 153 (2002) {Walsh). See St. 1991, c. 398, § 71 (“Any petition for reimbursement . . . shall be filed no later than two years from the date on which the benefit payment for which the reimbursement request is filed was made”).
The parties had stipulated that General Motors had satisfied all other requirements of G. L. c. 152, § 37.
In its brief the Fund argues that this court should borrow a statute of limitations from either G. L. c. 152, § 41 (four years), or G. L. c. 260, § 3A (three years). It is not clear from the record whether the Fund raised these particular statutes in its argument to the board. We assume however, that these issues were raised where, as discussed infra, the board relied on Walsh.
The administrative judge also said that the same issue was present in Oakes’s Case, post 190 (2008), decided today, and the board, as well as a single justice of the Appeals Court, summarily affirmed the administrative judge’s decision that an insurer’s claim for reimbursement was not time barred.
General Laws c. 152, § 12 (2), permits an appeal to the Appeals Court from a decision of the board pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and provides that G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), does not apply to such an appeal.
The dissent takes issue with the use of the word “always” twice in this opinion to characterize the assumption on which the Fund’s argument for borrowing a statute of limitations is based. Post at 184 n.8. In its brief, in the subheading to the discussion of this issue, the Fund states: “In the absence of an express statute of limitations [in § 37], an analogous statute of limitations must be applied to an insurer’s claim for reimbursement based on the nature or gist of the action” (emphasis added). In addition, the Fund states in it brief, “What no tribunal has done to date, despite clear direction from this [cjourt, is to analyze [the] claims ... to determine what rule of timeliness should apply when stale reimbursement petitions are filed ...” (emphasis added).
Moreover, at oral argument the attorney for the Fund made the unqualified statement that it was a legal error for the board to find no statute of limitations because it was not the law of this court. He also stated, without qualification, that if a statute is silent, the court “will identify and supply” one, because the court has rejected the concept that the absence of a statute of limitations means that none applies; and that the court has said it is “duty bound” to supply a statute of limitations where none exists.
As can been seen, the essence of the Fund’s argument is that a statute of limitations should be supplied here. The semantics over the characterization of the Fund’s argument carries no legal import. As discussed infra, the Fund fails to meet its burden of showing that the board’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. Massachusetts Med. Soc’y v. Commissioner of Ins.,
The Fund does not renew the argument, made before the administrative judge, to borrow the two-year statute of limitations from the 1991 amendment to § 37.
In addition, in a postargument letter, the Fund makes clear that whatever the discussion at oral argument concerning regulations promulgated by the Department of Industrial Accidents, the Fund is not arguing that any regulations bar General Motors’s claim for reimbursement pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 37.
In its brief the Fund cites Orekoya v. Bank of New England, 14 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 29, 32 (2000), to support its assertion that G. L. c. 152, § 41, is a valid section from which to borrow a statute of limitations. In Walsh, the board analyzed the reason the Fund’s reliance on the Orekoya case was “unavailing” by stating the reason that borrowing a statute of limitations was appropriate in the Orekoya case but not apt in the Walsh case. Walsh, supra at 154. The Fund does not address the board’s specific analysis of the Orekoya case and thus does not explain how that analysis is unreasonable.
Even though the Walsh decision discussed borrowing from G. L. c. 260, § 2, and here the Fund advocates borrowing from G. L. c. 260, § 3A, the Fund does not explain how the board’s rejection of this particular statute is unreasonable. General Laws c. 260, § 3A, applies to claims against the Commonwealth pursuant to G. L. c. 258, the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act. General Laws c. 152 was designed to replace tort actions. Walker’s Case,
One of the cases on which the Fund relies for its proposition that the board should have borrowed a statute of limitations, Nantucket v. Beinecke,
Moreover, the workers’ compensation cases to which the Fund refers in its postargument letter are distinguishable. Two cases involve statutes of limitations for actual actions filed in court, Pina v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
The Fund cites four cases involving § 37 pending in the Appeals Court.
We also note that, according to the plain language of G. L. c. 152, § 65 (3), insurers, such as General Motors, must inform the Fund each year of losses paid under G. L. c. 152 in the previous twelve months. The Fund makes no charge, nor is there any evidence in the record, that General Motors did not fulfil its statutory duty. The Fund does not address how its argument is affected by the incorporation of General Motors data in the annual assessment of employers pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 65 (3) and (4) (d), as appearing in St. 1985, c. 572, § 55.
Pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 12A, the insurers request reasonable costs for “attorney’s fees, briefs, and other necessary expenses” in connection with this appeal. The statute mandates that we grant the request. Pursuant to the procedure set forth in Fabre v. Walton,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting, with whom Marshall, C.J., and Cordy, J., join). The court today in effect holds that, while all employees who have suffered or suffer second injuries must file for compensation within four years,
1. Scope of review of agency action. At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of what have been known as the “Second Injury Fund”
While a core principle of administrative law mandates that we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it,” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), judicial deference to agency action is most appropriate when the agency acts on the basis of its technical or policy expertise, and least appropriate when the agency ventures into the courts’ own “traditional area of expertise.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm’n,
The court in this case defers to the board’s decision in Walsh v. Bertolino Beef Co., 16 Mass. Workers’ Comp. Rep. 151 (2002) (Walsh), apparently the first administrative appeal in which the board interpreted the 1985 Act to provide employers paying compensation to employees suffering a second injury
It is thus necessary to focus on the language and any available legislative history of the 1985 Act to determine whether in amending § 37 at that time, the Legislature did intend that there be no time limit on an insurer’s right to claim reimbursement. However, the court in the present case does not take on this task itself, but rather defers to the analysis of language and legislative history offered by the board in its Walsh decision. Ante at 175-177. I therefore consider the board’s decision. The board posited two sources of what it considered clear expressions of a legislative intent to have no limitations period apply to insurers’ § 37 reimbursement claims that are governed by the 1985 Act: the 1991 Legislature’s decision to make the statute of limitations it added to § 37 in the 1991 Act prospective only, and the fact that G. L. c. 152, as amended by the 1985 Act, includes specific statutes of limitations in some sections but not in § 37. The court calls the board’s interpretation “not unreasonable.” Ante at 178.1 respectfully disagree.
Certainly it was within the power of the 1991 Legislature to declare that from that time forward there would be no statute of limitations applicable to insurers’ reimbursement claims for second injuries that had occurred between 1985 and 1991 — as opposed to changing the intent of the 1985 Legislature itself. However, in order for us to conclude that the 1991 Legislature adopted this position, we must find that intent to be clearly expressed. Nantucket v. Beinecke,
The board, in quoting the decision of the administrative judge, also purported to find an expression of legislative intent in the fact that G. L. c. 152, as amended by the 1985 Act, “contains explicit language limiting the period for which certain benefits
Statutes of limitations provide many well-recognized benefits for the administration of justice, including allowance for “the temporal finality necessary for the orderly conduct of human affairs,” Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc.,
Because the Legislature has not clearly expressed an intent that reimbursement claims arising under the 1985 Act should be subject to no time limitation, it is our interpretive duty to look to the essence of the claim and identify an appropriate limit to apply.
See G. L. c. 152, § 41.
See G. L. c. 152, § 37, as appearing in St. 1991, c. 398, §§ 71, 106.
See Daly v. Commonwealth,
The statutory provisions governing compensation and reimbursement for second injuries are set out in G. L. c. 152, §§ 37 (§ 37) and 65, first enacted in 1919, St. 1919, c. 272, §§ 1, 2, and amended in a number of respects both before and after the 1985 amendment to § 37 (1985 Act). In particular, as discussed in the court’s opinion, ante at 172, § 37 was substantially amended in 1991. See St. 1991, c. 398, § 71. Since its inception, the Second Injury Fund was intended “to encourage the employment of previously injured persons by providing a fund which would pay a portion of the compensation burden that would result should the employee suffer a further injury. It might be anticipated that the subsequent injury, compounded with the previous one, would often lead to more serious disability.” Daly v. Commonwealth,
As part of the 1985 revisions to G. L. c. 152, the Second Injury Fund was replaced by the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (Fund), the appellant in this case, which has a number of additional functions unrelated to second injuries; in contrast to the old Second Injury Fund, the newer Fund draws its contributions from employers rather than from insurers. See G. L. c. 152, § 65 (2), as appearing in St. 1985, c. 572, § 55; Daly v. Commonwealth,
The court posits that “the board’s interpretation is in keeping with the purpose of § 37 (facilitating the rehiring of injured workers) by making sure that insurers are reimbursed.” Ante at 179. While an agency’s policy determinations regarding how best to effectuate a statute’s purpose are appropriately accorded considerable deference, see, e.g., Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Health Care Fin. & Policy,
At issue in Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
I do not read this language to suggest that any agency with adjudicatory experience is entitled to great deference on all procedural questions related to the time in which petitions may be filed. More to the point, however, the holding in the Falmouth case is not determinative of the instant case, because, unlike the regulation under review there, the board’s action here is not a rule promulgated pursuant to a specific delegation of discretionary authority but rather a direct interpretation of legislative history and intent — an area traditionally entrusted to the courts.
Section 37 did not contain any limitations period on reimbursement claims before passage of the 1985 Act, either. See, e.g., St. 1973, c. 855, § 2. However, there is nothing in the records of these cases or in the arguments of the parties that sheds any light on how claims for reimbursement were treated under the earlier versions of § 37. Thus, we have no information whether — as was true for much of the period between 1985 and 1991 (a point discussed in note 10, infra) — there were administrative rules, regulations, or policies in place that prescribed a specific period of time in which reimbursement claims could be filed, or whether the issue of a limitations period was ever raised by anyone. Accordingly, I agree with the implicit conclusion of the court and the parties that the only relevant time periods to consider in this case are the “Mid-Act” period from 1985 to 1991, which is governed by the 1985 Act, and the “New Act” period after 1991, which is governed by the 1991 Act.
The court repeatedly characterizes the Fund’s argument to be that courts
The court’s citation of two cases, State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward,
In the circumstances, the board and this court are essentially left to conjecture as to the motivation of the 1991 Legislature in making the limitations period prospective, and there are explanations available that seem equally if not more plausible than the one selected by the board. For example, the Legislature may have made the limitations provision in § 37 prospective only simply because it was part of a complete rewriting of the section that implemented several substantive changes that the Legislature did not wish to have applied retroactively. These substantive changes included altering the reimbursement provided from “an amount equal to seventy-five per cent” to “an amount not to exceed seventy-five percent”; cutting back on the categories of compensation eligible for reimbursement; excluding from reimbursement eligibility self-insurers and municipalities that opt out of contribution to the Fund; and adding a requirement of personal knowledge on the part of the employer of the employee’s preexisting impairment. Compare St. 1973, c. 855, § 2, with St. 1985, c. 572, §§ 48, 49, and St. 1991, c. 398, § 71. Cf. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth,
Moreover, although the board and the court do not address the point, at least as of 1988 and extending through 1991, the Department of Industrial Accidents, as the principal agency administering the workers’ compensation system in Massachusetts, had in place a regulation specifically prescribing a rolling two-year limitations period for the filing of requests for reimbursement pursuant to § 37. See 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.07(3) (1988). (The text of this regulation changed thereafter, but it is clear that at least through 1991, it imposed the two-year limitations period.) It is appropriate to presume that the Legislature in 1991 was aware of this regulatory provision and may therefore have deemed retroactive application of the new statute of limitations unnecessary. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
In Locator Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen.,
The court further pointed out that “it would be illogical to apply a strict three-year statute of limitations period to bar a claimant from seeking her underlying award for a taking . . . while allowing that same claimant an indefinite period of time in which to file an action for additional interest on the Treasurer’s investment of that award.” Id. While the board is correct in noting that an employee’s right to compensation following an injury is separate from the insurer’s right to reimbursement for that compensation, it seems similarly illogical to apply a strict statute of limitations to the underlying claim but allow insurers (in “Mid-Act” cases only) an unlimited time in which to seek reimbursement.
See, e.g., State Bd. of Retirement v. Woodward,
Because the nature of the claim here is one seeking reimbursement from a special revenue fund in the State treasury, G. L. c. 152, § 65 (2), I believe an appropriate time limit may be borrowed from G. L. c. 260, § 3A, which imposes a three-year statute of limitations on claims against the Commonwealth.