Commonwealth v. White
193 A.3d 977
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2018Background
- In 1998, then-17-year-old Nicholas White shot and killed his father; convicted of first-degree murder and abuse of a corpse and originally sentenced in 1999 to life without parole (LWOP).
- White pursued PCRA relief; after Miller and initial Pennsylvania rulings, his first PCRA was dismissed as untimely; Montgomery later made Miller retroactive and White filed a successive PCRA.
- At a 2017 resentencing hearing (PCRA court), the court granted relief and imposed a 35-years-to-life minimum sentence (making White parole-eligible after 35 years).
- White filed post-sentence motions arguing the court failed to articulate Miller-factor analysis, failed to consider rehabilitation, impermissibly applied mandatory provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1, and imposed a de facto LWOP sentence.
- The Superior Court reviewed discretionary-aspect and legality claims, considered Batts II guidance for resentencing juveniles convicted pre-Miller, and affirmed the 35-to-life sentence.
Issues
| Issue | White's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA court erred by not articulating Miller-factor analysis on the record | White: Court failed to state how it weighed Miller factors, so no assurance factors were considered | Commonwealth: Miller-factor articulation unnecessary here because Commonwealth did not seek LWOP; court considered relevant mitigating evidence | Court: Moot as to Miller factors because LWOP not sought; treated as discretionary-sentencing claim and found court had sufficient information and did not abuse discretion |
| Whether the court failed to consider rehabilitation and other mitigating factors | White: Evidence of rehabilitation and mitigation was not adequately considered, producing an excessive minimum | Commonwealth: Court reviewed extensive sentencing memorandum, testimony, and mitigation materials; sentence complies with Batts II and §1102.1 guidance | Court: Court had comprehensive materials (functional PSI) and reasonably exercised discretion; no abuse found |
| Whether applying §1102.1 made the sentence an illegal ex post facto or mandatory sentence | White: Use of §1102.1 guidance was equivalent to imposing a mandatory statutory minimum in violation of due process/ex post facto | Commonwealth: Batts II requires courts to consult §1102.1 for guidance in setting term-of-years minima; the court did not impose a statutory mandatory minimum | Court: Sentence lawful; court used §1102.1 as guidance per Batts II and did not impose an illegal mandatory minimum |
| Whether 35-to-life is a de facto LWOP (no meaningful opportunity for parole) | White: 35-year minimum offers no meaningful parole opportunity; constitutes de facto LWOP absent finding of incapacity for rehabilitation | Commonwealth: 35 years permits parole eligibility at age 52 — a meaningful opportunity under Graham/Foust framework | Court: 35-to-life is not de facto LWOP here; White will be parole-eligible at 52, so opportunity for release is meaningful; claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II), 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. Supreme Ct.: guidance requiring term-of-years sentences and consultation of §1102.1 when resentencing juvenile homicide offenders)
- Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. Ct.: term-of-years may be de facto LWOP absent finding of incapacity to rehabilitate)
- Commonwealth v. Bebout, A.3d (Pa. Super. Ct.) (applied meaningful-opportunity-for-release analysis to uphold a long term-of-years minimum)