Commonwealth v. Walls
144 A.3d 926
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- On Sept. 19, 2013 Salim Walls confronted Assistant District Attorney Kathryn Brown in a mall, yelled that she prosecuted him (she had not), threw his hat, approached within a foot, and as he was escorted out said she caused his grandmother’s death and “she should be next.” No physical contact or physical injury occurred.
- Walls was charged with retaliating against a prosecutor or judicial official (18 Pa.C.S. § 4953.1), terroristic threats (18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1)), and harassment (18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4)).
- At a bench trial on July 1, 2014 the court convicted Walls of all counts and sentenced him to 11½–23 months’ imprisonment; Walls appealed.
- The Superior Court framed three principal statutory interpretive questions: (1) against whom must retaliatory action be taken under § 4953.1; (2) what type of “harm” satisfies § 4953.1; and (3) whether Walls’s conduct was an unlawful act versus protected remonstrance.
- The court reviewed sufficiency of the evidence de novo and applied statutory construction canons and in pari materia analysis with related Chapter 43 retaliation statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Walls) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 4953.1 requires retaliatory action be directed at the specific prosecutor/judge whose official act motivated retaliation | Any individual may be targeted; statute criminalizes harm to “another” in retaliation for a prosecutor/judge’s lawful official action | Retaliation must be directed at the specific prosecutor/judge whose official conduct motivated the defendant | Held: Retaliation against any individual suffices so long as it is taken in retaliation for a prosecutor/judicial official’s lawful official act (statutory “another” and use of “a” support this) |
| What type of “harm” § 4953.1 requires (does mental/emotional harm suffice?) | Emotional or psychological harm (fear, career reassessment) suffices; attempted harm language expands liability | “Harm” must be distinct from the threat/unlawful act; mere intimidation insufficient; protected remonstrance claim | Held: Harm must be distinct from the unlawful act/threat and cannot be satisfied merely by the psychological fear/intimidation that normally accompanies a threat; attempted harm must be an attempt to inflict that distinct harm |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Walls harmed or attempted to harm under § 4953.1 | At minimum Walls attempted to harm ADA Brown by threatening her; his conduct placed her in fear | No substantial step toward harming occurred; threat was spontaneous and produced no distinct harm | Held: Evidence insufficient — no distinct harm and no substantial step showing attempted harm; conviction under § 4953.1 reversed |
| Sufficiency of evidence for terroristic threats and harassment | Terroristic threats: threat to commit violence with intent to terrorize (statute aims at settled intent); Harassment: communicated threatening words to alarm | Walls: statements were spur-of-the-moment, transient anger, no settled intent to terrorize; harassment requires intent to harass/annoy/alarm | Held: Terroristic threats conviction reversed (insufficient proof of settled intent to terrorize — spur-of-the-moment); Harassment conviction affirmed (sufficient evidence of intent to alarm/harass) |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788 (Pa. Super. 2015) (standard of review for sufficiency challenges)
- Commonwealth v. Haney, 131 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2015) (sufficiency review principles)
- Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 909 A.2d 1224 (Pa. 2006) (harm under witness-retaliation statute must be distinct from threat; psychological fear insufficient)
- Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 924 A.2d 636 (Pa. 2007) (in pari materia reading of Chapter 43 provisions)
- Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 409 A.2d 888 (Pa. Super. 1979) (threats made during chance heated confrontations often lack settled intent to terrorize)