Commonwealth v. Tyson
119 A.3d 353
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- In August 2010 G.B. awoke twice to find Jermeel Tyson having vaginal intercourse with her; Tyson admitted intercourse but contested consent. She reported and the Commonwealth charged Tyson with rape and related offenses.
- The Commonwealth sought to admit Tyson’s 2001 Delaware rape conviction (T.B. — victim asleep) under Pa.R.E. 404(b) for common scheme and absence-of-mistake purposes; Tyson moved to exclude it.
- The trial court excluded the prior rape conviction; the Commonwealth appealed. A panel of this Court initially affirmed, but the matter was heard en banc.
- The Commonwealth argued substantial factual similarities (victim profile, acquaintance status, invited-guest context, victim compromised/unconscious, intercourse in bedroom/early morning) made the prior conviction admissible to prove scheme and lack of mistake about consent.
- The majority held the prior conviction was admissible under both the common plan/scheme and absence-of-mistake exceptions to Rule 404(b), finding the probative value outweighed unfair prejudice and that incarceration time should be excluded in the remoteness analysis.
- A dissent disagreed, emphasizing material differences between the incidents, remoteness, and the risk that the evidence would improperly lead the jury to decide on propensity rather than disputed consent.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Tyson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior rape under common plan/scheme (Pa.R.E. 404(b)) | Prior rape shows a distinctive, repeating pattern (acquaintances invited into home while compromised/unconscious; early-morning bedroom intercourse) establishing a common scheme; five-year look-back (excluding incarceration) is not too remote; probative value > prejudice. | Prior offense and instant facts differ in important respects (context of visit, disputed consciousness, sequence of events); similarities are generic to sexual-assault cases and insufficient to show a "signature"; prejudicial risk outweighs probative value. | Reversed exclusion: prior conviction admissible under common plan/scheme — facts sufficiently distinctive and similar; remoteness not dispositive after excluding incarceration; probative value outweighs undue prejudice. |
| Admissibility of prior rape to show absence of mistake/accident (Pa.R.E. 404(b)) | Prior conviction tends to prove Tyson did not reasonably (or at all) mistake G.B. as consenting — prior identical circumstances show knowledge/state of mind and prior legal consequence. | The incidents are not "remarkably similar;" contexts and contested facts (e.g., whether G.B. was awake) undermine relevance for absence of mistake; admission risks unfairly prejudicing jury. | Reversed exclusion: prior conviction admissible to rebut defense of mistake; similarities sufficiently probative and not overly remote or unduly prejudicial. |
| Remoteness of prior conviction | Time in prison should be excluded from the remoteness calculation; relevant lapse = five years, which (given similarities) is not excessive. | Ten years since prior conviction is remote; after considering differences, lapse undermines probative value. | Majority: incarceration excluded; effective five-year gap not excessive given similarity. Dissent: time gap weighs against admissibility. |
| Unfair prejudice vs. probative value (Pa.R.E. 403) | Prior conviction is highly probative on consent and state of mind; limiting jury instruction can mitigate undue prejudice; prosecution has a substantial need because identity is not disputed. | Prior rape risk will unduly inflame the jury and serve only to show propensity; the Commonwealth’s asserted need does not justify admission where victim testimony is available and credible. | Majority: probative value outweighs unfair prejudice; cautionary instruction can reduce risk. Dissent: prejudice outweighs probative value; evidence would impermissibly encourage decision on propensity rather than facts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2002) (standard of review for admission of evidence)
- Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2007) (common plan/scheme framework and balancing factors)
- Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2010) (remoteness less important when crimes are highly similar)
- Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. 1996) (admission of prior sexual-offense evidence under common plan despite multi-year gap)
- Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279 (Pa. Super. 2014) (admission for absence of mistake when incidents are remarkably similar)
- Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2004) (absence-of-mistake admission where crimes were highly similar)
- Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657 (Pa. 2014) (probative value must outweigh unfair prejudice for 404(b) evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131 (Pa. 2007) (definition of unfair prejudice and jury instruction mitigation)
- Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866 (Pa. 1996) (Commonwealth's need can justify admission where uncorroborated victim testimony might leave reasonable doubt)
- Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595 (Pa. 2013) (common plan requires method so unusual as to be like a signature)
- Commonwealth v. Spruill, 391 A.2d 1048 (Pa. 1978) (purpose of Rule 404(b) to prevent conviction by proof of unrelated crimes)