98 N.E.3d 155
Mass.2018Background
- Torres was indicted on nine counts including stalking and several assault-related charges arising from alleged abuse and a head-butt that damaged the complainant's teeth.
- The complainant applied for victim compensation through the Attorney General to pay for dental repairs; that application was initially disclosed by the victim advocate in the DA’s office but the Attorney General’s file remained sealed.
- On the eve of trial Torres sought production of the Attorney General’s victim compensation file (arguing mandatory discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 or, alternatively, third‑party production under Rule 17).
- The trial judge refused to order production, relying on a regulation declaring compensation files confidential; the judge admitted redacted dental records that omitted references to the compensation application and the dentist’s medical assessment attributing breakage to decay.
- The jury convicted Torres of stalking (requiring at least three incidents) and acquitted him of the other charges; jurors asked whether compensation depended on conviction and which proof needed only one incident.
- The SJC vacated the stalking conviction, holding the Rule 17 request should have been evaluated under the Dwyer/Lampron standard, the redaction of medical causation was erroneous, and the judge’s answer to the jury created confusion about the stalking burden, requiring a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Torres' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production of AG victim compensation records: Rule 14 vs Rule 17 | AG not a party; files confidential; no promise/inducement by DA | Records are material; either in Commonwealth control (Rule 14) or third‑party records producible under Rule 17 | AG files not subject to Rule 14; but denial under Rule 17 was error — judge should apply Dwyer/Lampron despite regulatory confidentiality |
| Whether victim compensation application constituted a promise/inducement | Compensation is a separate statutory benefit administered by AG; not an inducement by DA | Application and related communications could show motive/bias or an inducement to testify | No showing of a DA promise or agreement; but records were relevant to credibility and should be considered under Rule 17 |
| Redaction of dental records (medical causation and compensation references) | Redactions permissible to avoid improper inference about liability or ability to pay | Records should be admitted unredacted; medical causation is proper medical evidence | Redaction of the dentist’s medical causation opinion (decay vs trauma) was an abuse of discretion — that medical diagnosis was admissible under G. L. c. 233, § 79 |
| Jury instruction / response re: stalking burden (three incidents) | Instructions read as a whole; no miscarriage of justice | Judge’s supplemental answer misstated burden, risking confusion between single‑incident offenses and stalking’s three‑incident requirement | Trial court’s supplemental instruction created ambiguity about the essential element (three incidents) and posed a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; new trial required |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122 (standard for third‑party confidential records discovery)
- Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265 (application of Dwyer standard to confidential third‑party material)
- Commonwealth v. Wanis, 426 Mass. 639 (scope of prosecutor's Rule 14 disclosure duty)
- Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704 (disclosure of promises/agreements with government witnesses)
- Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100 (right to probe witness financial compensation and bias)
- Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233 (admissibility of medical records and distinctions between medical observations and legal conclusions)
- Commonwealth v. Richards, 384 Mass. 396 (instructions evaluated as a whole; risk when jury may rely on incorrect portion)