Commonwealth v. Tejada
161 A.3d 313
Pa. Super. Ct.2017Background
- Ricky Tejada, a state-prison inmate, spit in a corrections officer’s face while being removed from the law library; charged with aggravated harassment by prisoner.
- At the first trial Tejada disrupted proceedings, attacked his defense attorney, and was removed from the courtroom; the judge declared a mistrial.
- The trial court thereafter barred Tejada from physically attending the retrial because of his prior violent/disruptive conduct, but permitted participation via two-way videoconference.
- A videoconference hearing was held five days before the retrial to determine whether Tejada had rehabilitated; the transcript of that hearing is not in the certified record.
- Tejada was tried in absentia (physically absent but appearing by video), convicted by a jury, and sentenced to 21–42 months’ incarceration.
- Tejada appealed, raising (1) that video-only participation violated his constitutional rights to be present and confront witnesses and (2) that the court sentenced him without a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) or adequate reasons for dispensing with one.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument (Tejada) | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court deprived Tejada of a constitutional right by refusing physical presence at the pre-retrial hearing and using videoconference for jury selection/trial | Tejada argued the court should have allowed him to appear in person to demonstrate rehabilitation and reclaim his right to be physically present; videoconference excluded him and thwarted due process/Confrontation Clause protections | Court’s use of videoconference was permitted because Tejada forfeited his right to be physically present by his prior disruptive/violent conduct; videoconference satisfied fairness and Rule 119 | Court held no constitutional violation: Confrontation Clause did not require physical presence for this proceeding; due process did not require in-person appearance because his presence would not have materially improved reliability; videoconference authorized by Pa.R.Crim.P. 119 |
| Whether sentencing without a PSI violated Rule 702 and required resentencing | Tejada objected at sentencing to absence of a PSI and argued the court failed to state reasons for dispensing with it before imposing an incarceration sentence | Commonwealth/trial court implied they had sufficient knowledge to sentence without PSI (citing Flowers) | Court vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing because the record does not show the trial court possessed sufficient, documented information to substitute for a PSI or that the court adequately explained why PSI was dispensed with |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (defendant may forfeit right to be present through disruptive conduct; judge may remove unruly defendants)
- Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (due process guarantees presence when presence would contribute to fairness; absence permissible when it would not affect reliability)
- Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (defendant has right to be present when presence has a reasonably substantial relation to opportunity to defend)
- Commonwealth v. Vega, 719 A.2d 227 (Pa. 1998) (waiver of right to be present defective in that case; analysis of right to presence)
- Commonwealth v. Flowers, 950 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. 2008) (trial court may sentence without PSI if record shows sufficient information to substitute for PSI; harmless-error framework for dispensing with PSI)